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ERISA: Nonwaivability of Preemption
George Lee Flint, Jr.*
Congress has attempted to encourage the growth of private

employee benefit plans' by insuring national uniformity through
the development of a federal common law for employee benefit
plans 2 through the Employment Income Retirement Security Act

of 1974 (ERISA).3 ERISA contains an explicit provision to safeguard this goal of uniformity which provides that federal law takes
precedence over state law. This preemption provision states that

ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . .

. . ",4

There is, however, a serious threat to this goal. Some confusion
remains as to whether ERISA applies to disputes over certain types

of employee benefit plans.' In the presence of ERISA preemption,
some state courts cannot determine if they have subject matter
jurisdiction, 6 that is, power to entertain an action relating to an

*
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1. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)
(quoting 129 CoNo. REc. S29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits: "It is also intended that
a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.")); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987); infra notes 349-61 and accompanying text.
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). See infra note 223 and accompanying text for the
complete text.
5. See, e.g., Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985) (The trial
court heard the case twice because the parties were initially unaware of ERISA's application
to denial of a lump sum payment from a defined benefit plan.).
6. One trial judge lamented:
I have not gone and read these cases, this multitude of cases that you've cited
in this thing. But, just for the record, and this is worth zero, I think it's
absolutely ridiculous that this question appears to be so unclear, even to federal
courts, as to what state courts can and cannot do. And, the matter to me, and
this may be a serious oversimplification of the problem, is that they probably
need to state that state courts cannot hear any matter regarding Employee
Retirement Income Security Act cases, period. But, I don't know whether I have
jurisdiction or not.
Ames v. Ames, 757 S.W.2d 468, 480-81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting the transcript of
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ERISA plan. State courts generally possess residual subject matter7
jurisdiction and may entertain any action not expressly forbidden.
Federal courts, on the contrary, may only consider those matters
expressly permitted by Congress or the Constitution. In the presence of this confusion, many courts have held that ERISA preemption is waived if not timely raised in the trial court. 9
This result frustrates the purpose of ERISA preemption. If
appellate courts permit state actions involving employee benefit
plans as a result of these procedural errors waiving preemption,
then, rather than the nationally uniform federal common law which
Congress desired, bodies of state common law will emerge which
would govern employee benefit plans in those jurisdictions. The
existence of state common law, which specifies varying fiduciary
duties and plan interpretations, will deter some multistate employers from adopting new plans or continuing old ones.' 0 The potential
for state extracontractual damages in connection with employee
benefit plans will similarly discourage other employers." This
double jeopardy of expanded liability and expanded damages could
undermine Congress's attempt to place the cost of private employee
benefit plans on private employers by encouraging voluntary plan
growth.
This Article first examines the problem currently facing the
appellate courts as to whether a party may initially raise ERISA
preemption after trial or on appeal. The Article then reviews the
various approaches to the problem by the appellate courts. Next,
the Article examines the preemption principle enunciated by the2
Supreme Court under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)

the trial court) (a case involving wrongful conversion of funds that the administrator should
have paid as a liquidation distribution from a terminated profit-sharing plan), aff'd &
modified, 776 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1809 (1990); see also Hughes
v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 848, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 859 (1989), cert. dismissed,
110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Van De Hey v. United States Nat'l Bank, 90 Or. App. 258, 262263, 752 P.2d 848, 850 (1988).
7. See, e.g., TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 8.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522, at 60 (2d ed. 1985).
9. See infra notes 106-15, 152-82 and accompanying text.
10. See Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarran-FergusonAct: The Need for
Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 51 (1979) (suggesting that "plan administrators,
faced with hopelessly inconsistent federal and state regulations and contradictory judicial
pronouncements," will terminate employee benefit plans).
11. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
12. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-69 (1988)).
To determine the procedural effect of preemption of a particular statute requires exam-
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that some appellate courts regard as dispositive. The Article then
explores the failure of the appellate courts to follow the ERISA
mandate. Finally, the Article outlines the analysis appellate courts

should conduct relating the legislative intent to the procedural
effect of ERISA preemption in answering the question of whether
a party can waive the preemption. 3
This Article asserts that ERISA preemption is jurisdictional and,
therefore, may be raised for the first time on appeal. This approach
gives ERISA preemption the same procedural effect as NLRA
preemption and preserves a uniform federal common law with
respect to employee benefit plans, thereby encouraging the growth
of private employee benefit plans.
I.

THE PROBLEM

There are two types of employee benefit plans-single-employer

plans in which a firm sponsors plans for its employees only, and
multiple-employer plans in which several firms sponsor one plan
for all of their employees. 4 Most multiple-employer plans are
"multiemployer plans" maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement designed to benefit the labor union members of
several employers."
A.

Nongovernmental Civil Actions and Jurisdiction

Government regulation for multiemployer plans and single-employer, union-negotiated plans began with the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA).' 6 This Act primarily regulates
collective bargaining agreements. LMRA resembles NLRA in that
both lack an express preemption provision.

7

Section 302(c)(5) of

ination of the legislative intent. NLRA, however, possesses no express preemption provision.
Therefore, NLRA preemption rests solely on implication by the Supreme Court in San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959), based on the theory
that the congressional Act so occupies the field as to preclude state regulation. See also
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,
346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
330 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1947).
13. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has criticized the circuit courts for not
examining legislative history where so directed. United Mine Workers Health & Retirement
Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1982) (circuit court ignored the text and legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act and relied on case law to apply reasonableness to review a
trustee's nondiscretionary finding under a collective bargaining agreement).
14. J. LONOBEIN & B. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 48 (1990).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (1988).
16. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988)).
17. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985).
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LMRA requires the trustees of multiemployer plans to operate
them for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employee-benefici-

aries.18 Under this Section the courts have implied a number of
nongovernmental, civil actions, such as lawsuits by employers,

employee-beneficiaries, or trustees to enforce fiduciary duties,' 9 or

by employee-beneficiaries for benefits due. 2° Section 301(a) of
LMRA provides specific causes of action to enforce collective
bargaining agreements, 2 thereby affecting both multiemployer and
single-employer, union-negotiated employee plans. Under this provision trustees have sued employers for contributions, 22 and employee-beneficiaries have sued for benefits due. 23 Both state and
federal courts have jurisdiction for lawsuits under Section 301 or

Section 302.2

18. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988) (prohibiting employer payments to labor unions except
for payments to employee trust funds for the sole and exclusive benefit of their employees
and beneficiaries).
In the employee benefit area, LMRA attempted to eliminate the extortion, bribery, and
mismanagement plaguing union pension and welfare plans by controlling their establishment
and operation. Landau, Menholtz & Perkins, Protecting a Potential Pensioner's PensionAn Overview of Present and Proposed Law on Trustees' Fiduciary Obligations and Vesting,
40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 521, 535-41 (1974). Congress also became concerned that union
officials might convert plan resources to their own use, and, through LMRA, made it
illegal to set up a pension plan administered solely by a union. Id. at 535. Union officials
could only participate in plan administration and fund management as members of a board
of trustees on which both labor and management were equally represented. See § 186(c)(5)(B).
As a result, labor unions have developed two types of pension plans: (1) plans jointly
administered by both union and management, exempted from the LMRA provisions
proscribing payments to union officials, id.; and (2) plans, resulting from collective
bargaining administered unilaterally by employers, and subject to the proscription. See,
Schneider, Surviving ERISA Preemption: Pension Arbitration in the 1980's, 16 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 269, 271 (1980). Both settled disputes through arbitration prior to
ERISA. Id. at 276.
19. See, e.g., Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977) (employees
sued trustees for damages for failure to get employer to contribute), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978); Haley v. Palatnik, 509 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1975) (new trustees sued old trustees
to invalidate a self-dealing contract); Employing Plasterers' Ass'n v. Journeymen Plasterers'
Protective & Benevolent Soc'y Local 5, 279 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1960) (employers sued to
enjoin plan administrator's misuse of funds, primarily for political contributions).
20. See, e.g., Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
964 (1964).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988) (may bring suit in federal court without meeting diversity
requirements).
22. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Bernard, 359 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1966).
23. See, e.g., Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. The LMRA provision for collective bargaining agreements states that these suits
"may be brought" in federal court, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1978), but a litigant may also
bring the lawsuit in state court. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507
(1962). Litigants have brought suits in state court to enforce contribution requirements in
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The more comprehensive regulation of these collectively bargained plans and most of the remaining single-employer plans
began with ERISA. For these plans ERISA specifies reporting and
disclosure requirements, 25 participation and vesting requirements,

26

funding requirements, 27 and fiduciary standards. 2 Each plan generally possesses three fiduciaries-the employer who sponsors the
plan for his employees 29 and appoints the other fiduciaries,30 the
trustee who manages the assets of the plan, 3 and the plan admin32
istrator who operates the plan.
ERISA differs from LMRA by specifically providing for preemption of state law and for express actions with jurisdictional
limits. Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes several types of express,
nongovernmental, civil lawsuits by the plan's fiduciaries and employee-beneficiaries, for example: (1) an employee-beneficiary suit
for information;3 3 (2) an employee-beneficiary or fiduciary suit to
enjoin violations of ERISA or to obtain other equitable relief to
redress such violations, or enjoin violations of the plan or enforce
its provisions;3 4 and (3) an employee-beneficiary lawsuit for benefits
due. 35 Unlike LMRA practice, the non-benefits-due litigant must

collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Local 552, Journeymen Barbers v. Sealey, 368
Mich. 585, 118 N.W.2d 837 (1962); List Indus. v. Gelber, 11 Misc. 2d 735, 175 N.Y.S.2d
800 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
The LMRA provision for employee plans states that federal courts "shall have jurisdiction
... to restrain violations of this section." 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1988). Congress drafted
this provision, however, to avoid the anti-injunction requirements of the Norris-Laguardia
Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1988)). See 93 Cong. Rec. S4678 (daily ed. May 7, 1947) (statement of Sen. Ball). As a
result, courts have claimed that state jurisdiction also exists for restraining violations. See,
e.g., Nixon v. O'Callaghan, 392 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (removal case for
benefits due where the removal statute required state jurisdiction for removal). But see 28
U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988) (state jurisdiction no longer required); Cox v. Superior Court of
San Bernadino Co., 52 Cal. 2d 855, 346 P.2d 15 (1959) (writ of prohibition against
employer's enforcement of breaches of fiduciary duties).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (1988).
26. Id. §§ 1051-61.
27. Id. §§ 1081-86.
28. Id. §§ 1101-14.
29. Id. §§ 1002(16)(B), (21)(A).
30. See, e.g.,H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 272, 323 (1974)
("fiduciaries includes officers and directors of a plan, members of a plan's investment
committee and persons who select these individuals), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmIN. NEws 5038, 5103 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280].
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(14)(A), 1002(21)(A), 1103(a) (1988).
32. Id. §§ 1002(14)(A), (16)(A), (21)(A).
33. Id. §§ 1132(a)(l)(A), 1132(c).
34. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
35. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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bring suit in federal court under the jurisdictional provision of
ERISA, Section 502(e). 36 The preemption provision, Section
514,
3
preempts all state law relating to employee benefit plans.
B.

1

Preemption

1. Implied Preemption
The express preemption provision raises the question of what
standard to use in determining whether a specific state law is
preempted under the Constitution's supremacy clause.3" In the
absence of an express preemption provision, courts commonly
imply preemption by using one of two standards to determine

whether a state law unconstitutionally obstructs the purposes of a
congressional act. First, does the state law conflict or interfere"

with federal law,3 9 and, second, does federal law occupy th6 field? 4
Under both of these standards, 4 the court must seek evidence of
congressional intent to preempt. '
When dealing with implied preemption, the court should choose
the interpretation which creates the least possible displacement of

state law.4 2 The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger developed a tendency to find no implied preemption of state law by

fitting state laws into federal enactments rather th~n finding a
conflict or federal occupation of the field. 3

36. Id. § 1132(e)(1); see also infra note 225.
37. Id. § 1144(a); see also infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
39. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686
(1965). Even if conflict theory applied to a statute with an express preemption provision,
however, it would not be useful for ERISA preemption purposes because Congress also
intended to exclude state laws that were consistent with ERISA. See Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S.
85, 98-99 (1983)); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee
Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1984).
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 8-18 (1824); see also Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (pre-ERISA; NLRA does not preempt the Minnesota
Private Pension Benefit Protection Act); Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 526-33. Occupancy theory does not apply to ERISA due to
the express preemption provision. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 39, at 1315-16.
41. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1958).
42. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 39, at 1316.
43. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295300 (3d ed. 1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-25 to 6-29 (2d ed. 1988);
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism & the Burger Court,
75 CoLuM. L. REV. 623 (1975); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE
L.J. 363 (1978).
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Express Preemption

In contrast, an express preemption provision limits the judicial
inquiry to consideration of the text of the preemption provision. 44
For express preemption the court's goal is to prevent subtle or
incremental encroachment into a field Congress has chosen ex45
pressly to reserve for federal law.
Even when a statute has an express preemption provision, the
court must still determine the extent to which state law is affected
because it is unlikely that Congress contemplated preemption of
all state laws potentially touching on a particular state-law-related
field. 46 Therefore, the judicial inquiry focuses on the type of state
laws Congress actually considered. 47 Unfortunately, courts considering ERISA preemption have failed to rigorously apply the text
of the ERISA preemption provision to the facts of a particular
case .48

C. Avoiding State Causes of Action
The ERISA preemption issue typically arises in the context of
benefits-due lawsuits. Employee-beneficiaries desiring benefits from
employee benefit plans normally apply to plan administrators or
their designees, 49 who rule on the application. 0 If the plan administrator denies the application, the employee-beneficiary must first
appeal the decision to the plan administrator." If the plan administrator does not reverse the decision,5 2 the employee-beneficiary

44. See Kilman & Inman, supra note 39, at 1316.
45. Id.
46. Hirsch, supra note 40, at 538-49.
47. Id. at 540-41.
48. Id.
49. Any designee of a plan administrator is also a fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
(1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(2) (1988); McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 442-43 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (insurer with authority to deny or grant
claims was a fiduciary under ERISA); Schulist v. Blue Cross, 553 F. Supp. 248, 252 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (same), aff'd, 717 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1983).
50. ERISA provides that the plan administrator must have a procedure for making a
claim, communicating the denial to the employee-beneficiary, and appealing the decision.
29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1988).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1988).
52. The employee-beneficiary must exhaust the plan's appeal procedure before bringing
the benefit denial to a court. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1983); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 568
(9th Cir. 1980). But see Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 727 F.2d 177 (8th Cir.
1984) (an exception to exhaustion for retirees who are not owed a duty of fair representation
by the union), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985).
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may sue for recovery of benefits due under the plan." The employee-beneficiary may file a benefits-due action in either state
54
court or federal court under ERISA's jurisdictional provision.
There are several drawbacks to using an ERISA lawsuit to
recover benefits due to employee-beneficiaries. Notably, the court
will review the plan administrator's discretionary decision under
the favorable arbitrary and capricious standard," and the employee-beneficiary must prove that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious.5 6 Once the employee-beneficiary meets this burden of
proof, the court will uphold the plan administrator's decision if it
finds substantial evidence and a rational reason to support the
decision." Most plan administrators can easily satisfy this burden
of proof.
To avoid this deferential standard," some advocates for employee-beneficiaries have recast the lawsuits as arising under state
law, frequently as bad-faith claims-processing. 9 A lawsuit over a
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1988).
54. Id. § 1132(e)(1); see also infra note 225 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Flint, ERISA: The Arbitraryand CapriciousRule Under Siege, 39 CATH.
L. REV. 133 (1989) (note especially the cases cited in the article).
56. See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d
1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983).
57. See, e.g., Flint, supra note 55, at 139-43.
58. See, e.g., Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 684 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (E.D. La.
1988) (preemption where the state statute's standard for denial of benefits was "just and
reasonable," rather than "arbitrary and capricious").
59. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1987) (long-term
disability plan paid benefits irregularly); Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d
760, 761-62 (5th Cir. 1989) (group medical plan denied reimbursement of medical and
hospitalization expenses for a prolonged illness); Kelley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 882 F.2d
453, 454-55 (10th Cir. 1989) (long-term disability plan refused to pay medical bills incurred
after settlement); Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 87 (11th Cir.
1989) (group travel accident insurance issued pursuant to an employee benefit plan denied
the death benefit for a death on a non-business trip); Dueringer v. General Am. Life Ins.
Co., 842 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1988) (disability plan denied payments for reconstructive
surgery because employee was not totally disabled without it); Kanne v. Connecticut Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1988) (medical plan delayed paying airline,
physician, and hospital bills), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989); Hughes v. Blue Cross,
215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 846, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 857-58 (1989) (group medical plan used a
standard of medical necessity that departed significantly from community standards and
failed to properly investigate the claim), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Goodrich
v. General Tel. Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 675, 241 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1987) (long-term disability
plan delayed payment of benefits), rev. granted, 44 Cal. 3d 231, 746 P.2d 871, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 732 (1987); Drummond v. McDonald Corp., 167 Cal. App. 3d 428, 430, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 164, 165 (1985) (same); see also Mandel, Must Claims Denials Be Upheld Under
Arbitrary and Capricious-WhatStandard of Review Applies to Group Policies Issued to
ERISA Plans?, 19 FORUM 457 (1984) (suggesting insurance companies convert state badfaith claims-processing cases into federal ERISA claims to take advantage of the arbitrary
and capricious rule).

1991]

ERISA PREEMPTION

state cause of action also provides the employee-beneficiary with
advantages otherwise unobtainable under an ERISA action. For
example, state constitutions generally permit jury trials for state
actions in state court. 6° An ERISA action brought in federal court,
however, generally does not involve a jury trial. 6' A few state62
courts permit a jury trial when an ERISA action is before them.

See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (right to jury trial shall remain inviolate); N.Y.
§ 2 (same); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 (same); see also Egelko, Losing Faith
in Bad Faith: Suing Insurers for Handling Claims in Bad Faith was a Popular PastimeUntil Last Spring, 7 CAL. LAW Oct. 1987, at 27, 28.
61. Federal courts generally find no right to a jury trial for benefits-due suits under
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988), because the ERISA suit is an equitable action
or may involve legal questions only. See, e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647,
649-50 (3d Cir. 1990) (equitable); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989)
(equitable); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
826 (1988); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1987) (following equitable
precedent); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 620, 623 (11th Cir. 1987)
(following Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. .1979)); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d
521, 527 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Turner v. CF & I Steel Corp.,
770 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985) (equitable), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Berry v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (not a fact question); Blau v. Del
Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (following equitable precedent), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1982) (equitable);
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980) (not a fact question); Wardle v.
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980)
(equitable), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Contra Puz v. Bessemer Cement Co., 700
F. Supp. 267, 268 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (contractual in nature); Abbarno v. Carborundum Co.,
682 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (legal question); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co.,
114 F.R.D. 587, 597-98 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (contractual in nature); Paladino v. Taxicab
Indus. Pension Fund, 588 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (legal question); Pollack v.
Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (legal question), aff 'd without op.,
622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F.
Supp. 745, 747 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (legal question). See generally Comment, The Right to
Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions under Section 502(a)(l)(B) of ERISA, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 737 (1983) (explaining the two grounds for denial as: (1) viewing the arbitrary and
capricious review standard as a legal question and not a fact question; and (2) viewing the
matter as an equitable one because it involves a trust).
62. Some state courts will grant a jury trial under a state constitutional provision
despite ERISA preemption. See, e.g., Overcash v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 94 N.C. App.
602, 613-14, 381 S.E.2d 330, 338 (1989). In other cases, the parties do not question the
right. See, e.g., Herbst v. Humana Health Ins., Inc., 105 Nev. 114, 114, 781 P.2d 762,
763 (1989); Felts v. Graphic Arts Employee Benefit Trust, 680 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984).
Other state courts follow the federal district court decisions permitting jury trials. See,
e.g., Walker v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., Inc., 144 Misc. 2d 308, 308-10, 544 N.Y.S.2d
958, 959-60 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Fuller v. INA Life Ins. Co., 141 Misc. 2d 464, 466-69, 533
N.Y.S.2d 215, 217-18 (Sup. Ct. 1988). Contra Pfeiffer v. Roux Labs., Inc., 547 So. 2d
1271, 1272 (Fl t. App. 1989).
60.

CONsT. art. I,
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Moreover, the employee-beneficiary can recover extracontractual
damages for delays in benefit payment and infliction of emotional
distress in a state action, 63 but not in an ERISA action.M The most
considerable advantage of the state action is the possibility of
punitive damages.6 1 In a benefits-due ERISA action by an employee-beneficiary, the courts generally prohibit recovery of punitive damages.66
Unfortunately for the employee-beneficiary, ERISA preempts
state lawsuits for bad-faith claims-processing. 67 The plan administrator should timely raise the ERISA preemption issue to insure
that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies and to avoid the
68
risk of jury trials, extracontractual damages, or punitive damages.

63. Egelko, supra note 60; see also, e.g., Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
607 F. Supp. 899, 906 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (ERISA group medical plan insurer liable for
payment delays of nine months and emotional distress damages), rev'd, 867 F.2d 489 (9th
Cir. 1988) (preempted by ERISA), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989). See generally
Kornblum & Olson, California Leads the Way in Bad Faith, But No One Wants to FollowRecent Trends in California First Party Bad Faith Law, 14 WEST. ST. U. L. REV. 37
(1986).
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Assoc., 857 F.2d 514,
518 (9th Cir. 1988) (infliction of emotional distress); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Sokol v.
Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). See
generally Comment, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual
and Punitive Damages after Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 1014 (1986) (arguing that courts should permit extracontractual damages).
65. See, e.g., Kanne, 607 F. Supp. at 910 (insurer under an ERISA group medical
plan liable for punitive damages); see also Egelko, supra note 60.
66. See, e.g., Johnson, 857 F.2d at 518; Drinkwater, 846 F.2d at 825; Varhola v.
Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 817 (6th Cir. 1987); Kleinhans v. Lisle Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810
F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long-Term Disability Trust,
787 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1986); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing
Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1464-65 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Powell, 780 F.2d at 424; Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 653
F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 1084 (1981); see also Comment,
ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743
(1984-85); Comment, supra note 64 (arguing against recovery of punitive damages).
67. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1987); see also Egelko, supra
note 60; Barnes, Pilot Life v. Dedeaux: ERISA Preempts Bad Faith Claims Against
Insurers, 61 Wis. B. BULL. Feb. 1988, at 17.
68. Raising the preemption issue as an affirmative defense avoids the current problem
in some appellate courts concerning ERISA preemption in relationship to subject matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir.
1988) (to prevent waiver of ERISA preemption the respondent must plead it as an affirmative
defense); Dueringer v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1988) (same);
Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 851, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 861 (1989) (same),
cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); Castillo v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc., 776
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Some plan administrators' counsel, however, have failed to raise
this issue until appeal, 69 perhaps confused about the application
of ERISA to a lawsuit. 70 The question then is whether the plan
administrator has waived ERISA preemption. If so, the court may
treat the case as a state action regardless of the ERISA provisions
designed to encourage uniform treatment of voluntary private

employee benefit plans.7'
Some employee-beneficiary lawyers have charged that the problem arises from an "appellate ambush" by the plan administrator
who intentionally raised no objections in trial court only to raise
ERISA preemption on appeal after losing at trial with state law
defenses.7 2 This charge may have some validity for actions brought
in federal court and those state actions not involving benefits due.
The appellate court will dismiss these actions if it determines the
employee-beneficiary should have alleged an ERISA cause of action
at trial, and the statute of limitations may bar refiling these
lawsuits. 73 The charge has less validity for benefits-due actions in
state court because some state courts permit amendment of the
petition on finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 74 Even
when the plan administrator succeeds in forcing the employeebeneficiary to drop the lawsuit, the ambush will result in the plan
administrator or the employer incurring liability for additional
expenses.
As a fiduciary, the plan administrator's duty is solely to all
employee-beneficiaries and includes protecting plan funds. 71 One

S.W.2d 290, 292, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (same); see also Kanne, 607 F. Supp. at 902
(pled ERISA preemption as an affirmative defense); Lambert v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 211 Cal. App. 3d 456, 463-64, 259 Cal. Rptr. 398, 402 (1989) (same). Contra Calhoon
v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ERISA preemption is not an
affirmative defense as ERISA provides the plaintiff with an express cause of action);
Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (writ
granted) (ERISA preemption unsuccessfully attacked as not pled as an affirmative defense),
Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted) (same).
69. See infra notes 82-182 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Writ of Error at 39, Great N. Am. Stationers, Inc. v.
Ball, 770 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
73. Federal courts will dismiss actions if subject matter jurisdiction is not clear from
the pleadings. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3); see 13 C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 3522, at 73.
Also, the federal statute of limitations period is not tolled by the erroneous filing. 4 C.
WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 1056, at 187 (a dismissal without prejudice has the same effect
as if the petition were never filed).
74. See, e.g., Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989) (The trial
court is required to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend in order to establish
jurisdiction before granting a motion to dismiss, unless the amendment would be useless.).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
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of the fiduciary's duties is to insure that the plan only incurs
reasonable expenses.7 6 The fiduciary is liable to reimburse the plan
for any unreasonable expenses incurred, such as those generated
by the proposed additional litigation.7 7 Moreover, if the fiduciary
pays these expenses, the plan cannot reimburse the fiduciary because, under ERISA, the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement
only for reasonable expenses properly and actually incurred, not
7
unreasonable attorney's fees. 1
The fiduciary may be indemnified by the employer, however.
Department of Labor regulations permit indemnity agreements to
the extent that insurance is available. 79 ERISA permits plans to
purchase insurance for a fiduciary, if the insurer has recourse
against the fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty.80 The employer
is permitted to purchase insurance for the fiduciary without the
recourse limitation. 8 Therefore, either the fiduciary or the employer will bear the cost of the proposed additional litigation. As
a result, it is generally in the best interest of the fiduciary and the
employer to resolve the dispute quickly by discouraging frivolous
state lawsuits through consistent use of ERISA preemption.
II.

COURT RULINGS ON WAIVER OF

ERISA

PREEMPTION

Several appellate courts have considered whether a plan administrator has waived ERISA preemption by not raising the issue
before the trial court. Courts use two basic approaches to review
federal preemption. First, preemption is an affirmative defense
that a respondent must raise in the trial court or forever waive. 2
Second, preemption is a challenge to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction that a party may raise at anytime. 3 As jurisdiction

76.
77.

Id. § l104(a)(l)(A)(ii).
Id. § 1109. See generally Cornell & Little, Indemnification of Fiduciary and

Employee Litigation Costs under ERISA, 25 B.C.L. REv. 1, 32 (1983)

(specifying the

situations for which the fiduciary may be indemnified for attorney's fees as a proper
expense, but declaring that incurring unreasonable attorney's fees is a breach of fiduciary
duty).
78.
79.
80.

29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2) (1988).
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (1990).
29 U.S.C. § 1110(b) (1988).

81.

Id.

82.

International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 382-86 (1986).

83. Id. For a state court, federal preemption would constitute a challenge to the
court's subject matter jurisdiction in those cases where federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction, such as bankruptcy proceedings, patent and copyright cases, forfeitures under
the laws of the United States, admiralty and maritime cases, and violations of the federal
anti-trust laws, securities acts, and the natural gas act. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal.
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differs for each of the two types of ERISA nongovernmental civil
lawsuits, 4 some courts have reached conflicting results over ERISA
preemption as subject matter jurisdiction which depend on the
type of ERISA action. 5 Despite the conflict between the courts
over ERISA preemption, 6 most courts have determined that ERISA
preemption is nonwaivable in non-benefits-due lawsuits. Courts
have split, however, over benefits-due lawsuits.
A.

Non-Benefits-Due Litigation

Six state courts have decided non-benefits-due cases involving
ERISA preemption initially raised after trial or on appeal. Four
courts determined that the litigant had not waived the preemption;
two found the litigants had waived ERISA preemption. Only three
of these courts confronted the issue squarely, and all three concluded in favor of nonwaivability.
1. Nonwaivable
The primary argument advanced by two courts for the nonwaivability of the ERISA preemption in non-benefits-due lawsuits
is that jurisdiction lies exclusively with the federal courts.8 7 An

App. 3d 832, 848-50, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 859-60 (1989) (an ERISA case), cert. dismissed,
110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 10, at 36 (4th ed. 1983).
Under ERISA, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of non-benefits-due lawsuits,
suggesting ERISA preemption for these lawsuits may be nonwaivable. See Hughes, 215
Cal. App. 3d at 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (making a distinction between the two types
of ERISA civil actions).
84. The two types, of course, are benefits-due and non-benefits-due lawsuits. See supra
notes 36 & 54 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Hughes, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
86. See HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 1988).
87. See Young v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 112 Misc. 2d 692, 700-01, 447
N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Richland Hosp., Inc. v. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d 87,
93, 516 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (1987); accord Guthrie v. Dow Chem. Co., 445 F. Supp. 311,
315 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (in employee action to have benefit reduction for worker's compensation declared illegal, removal was denied because state court lacked jurisdiction); Time
Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 191 Ga. App. 766, 768-69, 382 S.E.2d 718, 719-20 (1989) (in employee
suit to enforce fiduciary's duty to plan, dicta described ERISA preemption for non-benefitsdue lawsuits as relating to subject matter jurisdiction); see, e.g., Terrell v. Life Ins. Co.,
174 Ga. App. 753, 753, 331 S.E.2d 609, 610 (1985) (widow's suit for death benefit); Peick
v. Murray, 141 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1084, 491 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1986) (trustee action to
recover improperly paid benefits); Prestridge v. Shinault, 552 So. 2d 643, 648 (La. App.
1989) (trustee lawsuit against the employer), cert. denied, 559 So. 2d 131 (La. 1990);
McMartin v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 159 Mich. App. 1, 3-4,
406 N.W.2d 219, 221 (1987) (employee lawsuit for benefit, not by terms of plan, but by
estoppel); Goldberg v. Caplan, 277 Pa. Super. 47, 52-54, 419 A.2d 653, 656-57 (1980)
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analogous argument for NLRA preemption has been successfully
made where exclusive jurisdiction lies with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). 8 For purposes of determining jurisdiction only, two courts recast each lawsuit in its proper ERISA form89
and concluded that it did not involve benefits due under ERISA.
In Young v. Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, a
New York trial level court found that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider a non-benefits-due case although the plaintiff urged a
recasting under LMRA. 90 The court determined that the ERISA
jurisdictional provision eliminated the court-created LMRA juris-

diction which would have otherwise provided the court with juris-

diction. 9' In Richland Hospital, Inc. v. Ralyon, the Ohio Supreme
(employer lawsuit to remove trustee); Duffy v. Brannen, 148 Vt. 75, 84-86, 529 A.2d 643,
648-49 (1987) (employee lawsuit for violation of fiduciary duties).
In Young, an employer sought to enjoin termination of participation of its employees
by a union-negotiated welfare plan. Young, 112 Misc. 2d at 692-93, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
The fiduciary's action for relief from a breach of fiduciary duty arises under 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(2) (1988). The plan raised ERISA preemption initially in a posttrial brief. Young,
112 Misc. 2d at 694, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 800. As recast, the lawsuit did not involve benefits
due, and the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 697, 447 N.Y.S.2d
at 801. The court properly verified this "plain-meaning" interpretation by examining the
congressional statements of the Conference Committee Report, Senator Javits, and Representative Dent. Id. at 699-700, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03; see infra notes 332, 335 & 353
and accompanying text.
In Ralyon, a hospital sued an employee-beneficiary for unpaid medical bills where the
employee-beneficiary cross-claimed misrepresentation of coverage prior to a denial of
benefits against the employer and its welfare plan. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 516
N.E.2d at 1238. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption initially on appeal. Id. To the
extent the claim involved a breach of fiduciary duty, the state court determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because ERISA's preemption provision eliminates all state
causes of action and its jurisdictional provision permits this type of ERISA lawsuit only
in federal court. Id. at 90, 92, 516 N.E.2d at 1239, 1241. The misrepresentation action for
breach of fiduciary duty also arises under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). The court felt so strongly
about this construction under the plain-meaning canon that it did not consider any legislative
history or prior case law.
88. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391-92
(1986).
89. See Young, 112 Misc. 2d at 700, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 803 ("A resolution of this
motion to dismiss rests then upon whether plaintiffs' action may properly be characterized
as one" stating an ERISA cause of action.); Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 89, 516 N.E.2d at
1239 n.5 (Because the claims concern fulfillment of plan duties and reconsideration of plan
terms, the claims relate to the administration of the plan and fall within ERISA's scope.).
90. Young, 112 Misc. 2d at 701-02, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
91. Id. The court's LMRA analysis is incorrect. ERISA explicitly provides for the
continuation of employee benefit regulation under LMRA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988)
(repealing only the Welfare and Pension Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72
Stat. 997 (1958)). See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1989) (exempting only unilaterally administered, collectively bargained plans from Department of Labor claims-procedure requirements if the plan contains an arbitration procedure); Schneider, supra note 18, at 280-81,
311 (expressing concern that ERISA may modify traditional labor dispute arbitration).
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Court found that it similarly lacked jurisdiction although it retained
jurisdiction for the associated benefits-due lawsuit. 92
A second argument for nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in
non-benefits-due lawsuits was advanced in Cadillac Insurance Co.
v. L.P.C. Distributing Co.93 by a Texas appellate court. The court
observed that only ERISA confers jurisdiction over any type of
ERISA-related lawsuit. 94 Therefore, if any petition related to an

ERISA plan fails to allege an ERISA cause of action, the plaintiff
has not invoked the jurisdiction of the court. 95 Rather than recast
the lawsuit as an ERISA action and conclude that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, this court noted that the petition alleged an
ERISA-related cause of action but failed to state an ERISA claim.9
The court concluded that, because a state court can only assert
jurisdiction over a claim relating to an ERISA plan through
ERISA, this petition failed to invoke state court jurisdiction. 97
In Molina v. Retail Clerks Union and Food Employers Benefit

Fund,9 a California appellate court dealt with ERISA preemption

raised initially on appeal and found no waiver. 99 The court con-

92. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 90, 516 N.E.2d at 1239. Although the court had recast
the petition as an ERISA cause of action to determine jurisdiction, it did not recast the
petition for substantive review and remanded the benefits-due action for reconsideration
under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 93, 516 N.E.2d at 1242; see infra
note 137.
93. 770 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). In Cadillac, an employer sued an insurance
carrier for wrongful termination of a group insurance policy under a welfare plan. Id. at
893. The insurance carrier raised ERISA preemption for the first time on appeal to defeat
a default judgment. Id. at 895. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 896.
94. Id. at 895 (the plaintiff failed to allege an ERISA cause of action or a preemption
exception. Therefore, the petition did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial
court.).
95. Id. at 895.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court relied solely on benefits-due case law for support. See Barry v.
Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 835, 478 N.E.2d 707, 711 (1985) (disapproved
by Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668 (1989)); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d
710, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted). This approach avoids the bifurcation of
ERISA preemption. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
98. 111 Cal. App. 3d 872, 168 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1980).
99. Id. at 878-79, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10. The Molina court affirmed a judgment
granting reimbursement to a union welfare plan from an employee-beneficiary where the
plan initially raised ERISA preemption on appeal. Id. Although correctly recognizing that
ERISA had eradicated state law and jurisdiction could only be asserted through ERISA,
the court erred in treating this as a benefits-due lawsuit. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215
Cal. App. 3d 382, 852, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 862 (1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200
(1990). Because the fiduciary sued as the assignee of the employee-beneficiary to receive
insurance proceeds, Molina, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 876-77, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 908, the suit
was one by the fiduciary to recover amounts wrongly paid to an employee-beneficiary
arising under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988), not one by a beneficiary for benefits due.
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sidered the ERISA preemption issue, however, only because the
trial court found that the plan was subject to LMRA. °°
The error in the reasoning advanced in Young and Ralyon can
be demonstrated by applying it in a hypothetical federal diversity
action. Relying on ERISA's preemption and jurisdictional provisions to eliminate all state causes of action, the Young-Ralyon
theory would recast the lawsuit as a non-benefits-due action under
ERISA for which the state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Unlike a state court, after recasting the action as an ERISA
action, 0' the federal court would continue to have subject matter
jurisdiction. 0 2 Therefore, ERISA preemption in the federal court
does not involve subject matter jurisdiction and is waivable. Under
Young and Ralyon, state courts would find no waiver where federal
courts would, and a disparity in ERISA preemption would result.
The reasoning in Cadillac yields a different result because it uses
a broader preemption than the Young-Ralyon theory. Because the
lawsuit is not recast, a federal court applying Cadillac in a diversity
action involving a non-benefits-due lawsuit would act as a local
state court. 0 3 Therefore, as in state court, preemption would be
nonwaivable. Although federal courts would also have federal
question jurisdiction, the result would be the same. Under the
federal pleading rules, a court would recast the claim under ERISA
and could assert subject matter jurisdiction.' ° This recasting would
not occur, however, unless the defendant raised ERISA preemption
before trial.
This potential disparity between filing in state or federal court
could adversely affect plans and fiduciaries in two situations. First,
fiduciaries that are in a federal court using the Young-Ralyon
reasoning would have to raise ERISA preemption before trial or
waive it. Second, fiduciaries that remove the lawsuit to a federal
court using the Young-Ralyon reasoning on the basis of diversity
rather than federal question jurisdiction, 5 presumably unaware

100. Molina, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 879, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
101. See 14A C. WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 3722, at 243; cf. Avco Corp. v. Aero-Lodge
No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (state action converted to a
claim under LMRA Section 301 following the preemption exception to the well-pleaded
complaint doctrine); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1986)
(removal to federal court for federal question jurisdiction), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 960
(1986).
102. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
103. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
104. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987) (state
claims may be converted into ERISA claims for purposes of removal).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) (permitting removal with diversity of citizenship as the
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that ERISA applies to the non-benefits-due lawsuit, will discover
that they have waived ERISA preemption. Federal courts relying
on the Cadillac reasoning, however, would find no waiver of
ERISA preemption in either case.
2.

Waivable
Not all state courts have agreed with the Ohio, New York,
Texas, and California courts. Two other state courts dealt with
non-benefits-due lawsuits and held that the defendants had waived
ERISA preemption on other grounds. 106 In both cases, the result
was the same whether the court recognized or refused to recognize
the nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in the non-benefits-due
lawsuit. 17

In Amalgamated Cotton Garment & Allied Industries Fund v.
Dion,01 8 a Pennsylvania superior court refused to consider an
ERISA preemption claim raised initially on appeal because the
defendant had not preserved that point and, therefore, had waived
it. 1°9 The court noted, however, that the Third Circuit had held
that ERISA did not preempt the state statute in question," 0 thereby
indicating that the appellant would have lost had the issue been
preserved. As a result, the court was not required to pass on the
question, and the waivability language is only dicta.
In Castillo v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc.,"' a second

Texas appellate court retracted its own dictum from two prior
basis for federal jurisdiction provided that no defendant is a citizen of the state in which
plaintiff brought the action, even if the state court lacks jurisdiction); see also 14A C.
WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 3722, at 231.
106. These were, then, multipoint opinions, or ones in which there was more than one
reason given for the holding.
107.

See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAmBLE BUSH 46-47 (1960) (describing the multipoint

decision as having a force of authority falling between a single-point holding and dicta);
see also National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 822-23 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J.) (refusing to fragment further a multipoint decision to avoid weakening the holding
more).
108. 341 Pa. Super. 12, 491 A.2d 123 (1985).
109. Id. at 15, 491 A.2d at 124. In Dion, a plan trustee sued an employer for
contributions to a union-negotiated welfare plan. Id. at 14, 491 A.2d at 124. The employer,
having lost at trial court, initially raised preemption on appeal. Id, at 14-15, 491 A.2d at
124. This recast action is by a fiduciary to enforce an obligation under ERISA. See May
v. Interstate Moving & Storage Co., 739 F.2d 521, 522 (10th Cir. 1984); 29 U.S.C. §
I132(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1988). The Dion court cited no authority for determining the waiver of
ERISA preemption. Dion, 341 Pa. Super. at 15, 491 A.2d at 124.
110. Dion, 341 Pa. Super at 15, 491 A.2d at 124 (citing Carpenters Health & Welfare
Fund v. Kenneth Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1983)).
111. 776 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). In Castillo, an employee sued an employer

for negligently causing the failure to inform the employee about coverage under a welfare
plan. Id. at 291. After trial, the employer obtained a judgment-notwithstanding-the-verdict
on the ground that the jury's finding of negligence was unsupported. Id. at 292.
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holdings on nonwaivability for benefits-due lawsuits.112 On the
basis of Fifth and Ninth Circuit benefits-due opinions," 3 the court
held that the defendant could not raise ERISA preemption after
trial.1 4 The Texas court also noted that no evidence supported
plaintiff's case," 5 and therefore, if the court had recognized the
nonwaivability of ERISA preemption, the result would have been
the same.
B.

Benefits-Due Litigation

Twelve courts have decided benefits-due cases in which the
litigants initially raised ERISA preemption after trial or on appeal.
Six state courts determined the litigant had not waived the preemption, and six state and federal courts found that the litigants
had waived ERISA preemption. Only four of these courts confronted the issue squarely. Of these, the three state courts concluded in favor of nonwaivability, and the federal circuit court,
found waiver.
1. Nonwaivable
The primary argument advanced by two state courts for the
nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in benefits-due lawsuits is a
non-benefits-due argument. Because ERISA exclusively governs
jurisdiction over an ERISA-related lawsuit, any ERISA-related
petition that fails to allege an ERISA cause of action does not

invoke the court's jurisdiction." 6 The courts noted, however, that

112. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(writ granted); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ
granted).
113. HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988); Dueringer v.
General Am. Life Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988); Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports,
Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). These federal opinions, however, apply to benefitsdue lawsuits and not to the non-benefits-due lawsuit at issue in Texas. The reasonings
developed by appellate courts for waivability differ in the two situations because of the
jurisdictional difference.
114. Castillo, 776 S.W.2d at 292-93 (raised initially in an objection to the jury charge).
The dictum retraction adheres to the principle that Texas courts must follow federal courts'
construction of federal statutes. See, e.g., Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979)
(following a Fifth Circuit opinion).
115. Castillo, 776 S.W.2d at 296 (no evidence of negligence).
116. See Providence Hosp. v. National Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund, 162 Mich.
App. 191, 412 N.W.2d 690 (1987); Hepler v. CBS, Inc., 39 Wash. App. 38, 696 P.2d 596,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
In Providence, a hospital sued a plan to recover fees as the assignee of the employeebeneficiary. Providence, 162 Mich. App. at 192-93, 412 N.W.2d at 691. Having lost at
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if the plaintiff had brought the lawsuit in its proper ERISA form,

the lawsuit would involve benefits due under ERISA for which
the state court had subject matter jurisdiction." 7

In Providence Hospital v. National Labor Union Health and

Welfare Fund,"8 the Michigan Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for reconsideration under ERISA. 119 In
Hepler v. CBS, Inc. ,1o the Washington Court of Appeals neglected

to recognize that the plaintiff's petition did not establish subject

matter jurisdiction. Instead of dismissing or remanding the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court directly applied
ERISA to the case.12' It concluded that a lower court would reach

the same liability result under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious
standard and modified damages to exclude those which ERISA
does not permit. 122 The court's direct approach fails to permit the
litigants or the trial court a chance to examine the dispute or
develop a record based on the applicable ERISA standard.
The disparity between these two treatments would make the
attempt to avoid ERISA costly to the employee-beneficiary in the
trial, the defendant first raised ERISA preemption in a motion to amend the judgment.
Id. at 193, 412 N.W.2d at 691. The court held the defendant had not waived ERISA
preemption and remanded the case for reconsideration under ERISA. Id. at 200, 412
N.W.2d at 694.
In Hepler, an employee sued for breach of contract resulting from wrongly calculating
disability benefits with an undisclosed formula. Hepler, 39 Wash. App. at 839-43, 696 P.2d
at 598-600. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption for the first time on appeal. Id. at
843, 696 P.2d at 600. Agreeing that the employer had not waived ERISA preemption, the
court proceeded to apply ERISA to the judgment, primarily the arbitrary and capricious
standard, and upheld the liability finding and modified damages. Id. at 844-48, 696 P.2d
at 600-02.
117. Providence, 162 Mich. App. at 199-200, 412 N.W.2d at 694; Hepler, 39 Wash.
App. at 845, 696 P.2d at 601.
118. 162 Mich. App. at 191, 412 N.W.2d at 690.
119. Id. at 194-95, 412 N.W.2d at 692, 694 (plaintiff correctly argued that his claim
was ERISA-based, but he relied impermissibly on Michigan law to enforce his claim).
Michigan follows the procedural rule under which, if the appellate court reverses because
the plaintiff alleged the wrong legal theory, the court should afford the plaintiff an
opportunity to retry his case rather than dismiss the action (the "retrial opportunity rule").
See, e.g., Husted v. McIntosh, 313 Mich. 507, 509, 21 N.W.2d 833, 834 (1946) (overturning
a directed verdict based on an erroneous theory of imputed negligence); Bricker v. Green,
313 Mich. 218, 236, 21 N.W.2d 105, 111 (1946) (same). This procedural point is of greatest
significance when the statute of limitations has already run, preventing ordinary refiling.
120. 39 Wash. App. at 838, 696 P.2d at 596.
121. Id. at 846-47, 696 P.2d at 601-02.
122. Id. The Washington court erred in not remanding. Washington also follows the
retrial opportunity rule, supra note 119. See, e.g., Haugen v. Central Lutheran Church,
58 Wash. 2d 166, 169-70, 361 P.2d 637, 639 (1961) (overturning a trial court dismissal of
a negligence action based on the fellow servant rule where the employee relationship did
not exist).
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latter jurisdiction. The employee-beneficiary has the burden under
ERISA to show that the fiduciary's decision is arbitrary and

capricious. 2 3 Proof of the state cause of action often does not
include proof necessary for an ERISA cause of action. 124 As a
result, when ERISA is applied initially at the appellate level, the

employee-beneficiaries will lose for failure to carry their burden.
A second argument, advanced in Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys-

tems, Inc. 125 by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, hinges
on legislative history suggesting that ERISA preemption should be

as broad as possible. 126 The court compared ERISA preemption to
NLRA preemption for unfair labor practices. 127 Created by judicial

fiat, 128 NLRA preemption relates to subject matter jurisdiction,
which is not waivable. 129 This limits all NLRA disputes to resolution

123. See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d
1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983).
124. See Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ
granted) (a favorable jury verdict on the state claim resulted in no evidence of fiduciary's
decision being arbitrary and capricious).
125. 394 Mass. 830, 478 N.E.2d 707 (1985).
In Barry, an employee sued for severance pay and vacation benefits. Id. at 832, 478
N.E.2d at 709. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption for the first time in a supplemental
brief before the appellate court. Id.
126. Id. at 836, 478 N.E.2d at 711 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
98-99 (1983) (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (remarks of Rep. Dent))).
Barry involved two welfare plans: a severance-pay plan and a vacation-pay plan. Id. at
832, 478 N.E.2d at 709. Employers had frequently decided that severance-pay plans were
not ERISA plans. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 951
(1989) (employer unaware in 1980 that termination-pay plan was subject to ERISA and
had not complied with ERISA's disclosure requirements); see also Blau v. Del Monte
Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984) (employer intentionally did not disclose written
separation-allowance policy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
Department of Labor regulations, however, make it clear that a severance-pay plan is a
welfare plan. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1990). Lawyers had doubted that plans for paying
unused vacation time out of the employer's general assets were subject to ERISA. Compare
Holland v. National Steel Corp., 791 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that these
vacation-pay plans constitute welfare plans) and Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 779 F.2d
1146, 1149 (6th Cir. 1985) (same) with Shea v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 810
F.2d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that vacation-pay plans do not constitute welfare
plans under 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b)(3)) and California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d
856, 859-61, modified, 783 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986)
(same) and Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, 144 Ill. App. 3d 616, 62125, 494 N.E.2d 581, 584-87 (1986) (same). The issue was finally settled in favor of the
Department of Labor regulations in Massachusetts v. Morash, 109 S. Ct. 1668, 1671-75
(1989).
127. Barry, 394 Mass. at 835, 478 N.E.2d at 711 (citing Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721,
725, 437 N.E.2d 1065-66 (1982) (construing NLRA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987)).
128. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
129. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 382, 394 (1986).
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by the NLRB rather than state or federal courts. 30 Subsequent
courts have used NLRA preemption to dismiss state causes of

action brought by employees challenging various labor practices
under NLRA.'3 ' Despite the alternative forum (the NLRB versus
federal or state court) and the implied versus express preemption
provisions distinguishing NLRA and ERISA, the Massachusetts

court reasoned that NLRA offered the broadest possible preemption and concluded that ERISA preemption would be at least as
extensive as NLRA preemption. 3 2 The court concluded that ERISA

preemption was also related to subject matter jurisdiction,' and,
therefore, a litigant cannot waive preemption.3 4 The court remanded the case for reconsideration as an ERISA lawsuit. 35
Three courts have indirectly indicated that ERISA preemption

is nonwaivable. In Ralyon, the Ohio Supreme Court handled
ERISA preemption equally for both non-benefits-due and benefits-

due, permitting the fiduciary to raise the matter for the first time
on appeal. 3 6 The court dismissed the non-benefits-due claim for
130. Id. at 391; see also Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1400
(9th Cir. 1988); Brooks v. A.S. Abell Publishing Co., 635 F. Supp. 118, 119 (D. Md.
1986); Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees, Local 8 v. Jensen, 51 Wash. App. 676,
679, 754 P.2d 1277, 1280 (1988).
131. See, e.g., Clayton v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., 679 F. Supp. 637, 638-39 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (wrongful discharge during strike); Level I Sportswear, Inc. v. Chaikin, 662
F. Supp. 535, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (employer prevented the establishment of labor union
through the tort of fraud and deceit); Brooks, 635 F. Supp. at 118-19 (tort action against
employer); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. United Cement Workers, 153 I11. App. 3d
1046, 1048-49, 506 N.E.2d 620, 622-23, appeal denied, 113 I11.303, 515 N.E.2d 112 (1987)
(discrimination against striking employees, bad faith negotiations); Jensen, 51 Wash. App.
at 689, 754 P.2d at 1280, 1285 (tortious interference with employment contract on sale of
business). All of these cases involved motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
132. Barry v. Dymo Graphics Sys., 394 Mass. 830, 835-36, 478 N.E.2d 707, 711 (1985);
see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983); infra notes 332 & 335
and accompanying text.
133. Barry, 394 Mass. at 835-36, 478 N.E.2d at 711; accord Barnick v. Longs Drug
Stores, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 377, 379, 250 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11 (1988) (employee suing
employer for wrongful discharge to prevent vesting of retirement benefits); Hagler v. J.F.
Jelenko & Co., 719 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Mo. App. 1986) (employee suing employer for
severance benefits). Contra Porter v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 189 Ga. App. 818, 820, 377
S.E.2d 901, 904 (1989) (trial court erred in concluding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because of ERISA preemption); Van De Hey v. United States Nat'l Bank, 90 Or. App.
258, 262-63, 752 P.2d 848, 850 (1988) (ERISA preemption did not divest state courts of
subject matter jurisdiction).
134. Barry, 394 Mass. at 835-36, 478 N.E.2d at 711.
135. Id. at 840, 478 N.E.2d at 714. Massachusetts follows the retrial opportunity rule,
supra note 119. See, e.g., Tosti v. Ayik, 386 Mass. 721, 723, 437 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1982)
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964 (1987).
136. Richland Hosp., Inc. v. Ralyon, 33 Ohio St. 3d 87, 88, 516 N.E.2d 1236, 1238
(1987).
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lack of jurisdiction and remanded137the benefits-due claim for reconsideration under ERISA rules.
In Soniat v. Travelers Insurance Co.,"' a multipoint opinion,
the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the fiduciary had not
waived ERISA preemption. 139 The court also held, however, that
ERISA did not preempt the state insurance law involved. 40 Therefore, the result was the same as if the court had recognized the
waivability of ERISA preemption for the benefits-due lawsuit.
The Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed preemption
three times, twice in dicta. In Gorman v. Life Insurance Co. of
4
the fiduciaries urged ERISA preemption in
North America,'1
pretrial motions and objections to evidence at trial, but neglected
to plead it as an affirmative defense. 42 Following the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Barry, 41 the Texas court stated that
ERISA preemption related to subject matter jurisdiction and was
nonwaivable.'4 The court recast the petition as one alleging an
ERISA action because the fiduciaries had raised ERISA preemption
before trial. The employee-beneficiary had not submitted proper
standard,
jury instructions under ERISA's arbitrary and capricious
45
and the court entered judgment for the fiduciary.

137. Id. at 93, 516 N.E.2d at 1242 (the trial court had not applied ERISA previously).
Ohio follows the retrial opportunity rule, supra note 119. See, e.g., Peltz v. City of S.
Euclid, 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132, 228 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1967).
138. 538 So. 2d 210 (La. 1989).
139. Id. at 212-15. In Soniat, an employee-beneficiary sued an insurer for denying
coverage for pregnancy benefits under a welfare plan. Id. at 211. For a discussion of the
reduced authority of the multipoint opinion see supra note 107.
140. Id. at 212-14.
141. 752 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted).
142. Id. at 712-13. In Gorman, an employee-beneficiary sued under a death-benefit plan
alleging only state causes of action and denied making any claims under ERISA. Id. The
trial court awarded judgment for the plan. Id. at 713.
143. Barry v. Dymo Graphics Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 835-36, 478 N.E.2d 707, 711
(1985). See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
144. Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 713.
145. Id. at 712, 714. Texas follows the retrial opportunity rule, supra note 119. See,
e.g., Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989) (before granting a motion
to dismiss the trial court is required to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend to
establish jurisdiction, unless amendment would be useless). The plaintiff in Gorman,
however, was alerted to the ERISA cause of action by the fiduciary's pretrial discussions.
Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 713.
In addition, Texas follows the rule that matters not specifically pled cannot be proved.
See, e.g., Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Tex. 1982). Because the plaintiff
effectively refused to amend to plead the ERISA cause of action, the court had no
alternative other than to construe the petition as if it had stated an ERISA cause of action
and affirm a judgment which, in essence, dismissed the action for failure to prove an
ERISA cause of action. Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 714.
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In Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 146 the employeebeneficiary urged that the fiduciaries had waived ERISA preemption by not pleading it as an affirmative defense although it was
pled in the answers. 47 Again the court related ERISA preemption
to subject matter jurisdiction and upheld the summary judgment
for the fiduciaries
on the basis that ERISA preempted the state
1 48
cause of action.

Castillo v. Neely's TBA Dealer Supply, Inc.149 involved a nonbenefits-due lawsuit. The court noted that its two earlier opinions
were dicta and retracted its comments on ERISA preemption as
subject matter jurisdiction. It followed the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
opinions,'50 deferring to federal court interpretations of federal
statutes."'
2.

Waivable
In contrast to the state courts, the Ninth Circuit, in Gilchrist v.
Jim Slemons Imports, Inc. ,52 seized upon the jurisdictional difference between a benefits-due and a non-benefits-due lawsuit.
Because the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction of the
recast ERISA lawsuit, the fiduciary can waive ERISA preemption
if it was not raised before trial.'53
The Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court had held
that NLRA preemption was nonwaivable 5 4 and, in International
Longshoremen's Association v. Davis,' had determined that because NLRA preemption involved a choice-of-forum question, as
the preempting statute specified the NLRB as the exclusive forum,
56
it was nonwaivable.

146.
147.

764 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted).
Id. at 292.

In Cathey, an employee-beneficiary sued for medical benefits due solely under state
causes of action and refused to plead ERISA causes of action when directed by the trial
court. Id. at 289.
148. Id. at 293.
149. 776 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
150. Id. at 293. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex. 1979).
152. 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
153. Id. at 1496-98.
In Gilchrist, a terminated employee sued his employer for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing with respect to, among other items, lost medical benefits.
Id. at 1492. The employee obtained a favorable judgment in trial court. Id. The fiduciary
raised ERISA preemption initially on appeal. Id. at 1496.
154. Id.at 1497.
155. 476 U.S. 380, 391 (1986).
156. See Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 849, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850, 860
(1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990).
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The Supreme Court held that NLRA preemption was not a
choice-of-law question in which a state court with jurisdiction must
apply federal law.' 57 From this rule that a choice-of-forum question
is nonwaivable, the circuit court inferred an inverse rule that a
litigant may waive preemption when only a choice-of-law question
is implicated.5 8 In Gilchrist, the Ninth Circuit found that ERISA
preemption involved a choice-of-law question because the federal
district court would retain jurisdiction even if the suit were recast
from a state cause of action to an ERISA claim.5 9 Because ERISA
preemption involves only a choice-of-law question, it is waived
unless raised before trial. 16°
Therefore, the Gilchrist rationale creates another bifurcation of
ERISA preemption law. Either, in an employee-beneficiary benefits-due lawsuit, preemption is waivable because litigants may bring
the suit in state or federal court rather than in an exclusive
forum, 61 or, in a non-benefits-due lawsuit, preemption is not
waivable because litigants are limited to federal court as an exclu162
sive forum.
The Fifth Circuit has followed the Gilchrist decision twice.163 In
Dueringer v. General American Life Insurance Co., 164 the court
found that the fiduciary had waived ERISA preemption when
initially raised on appeal because it had not pled preemption as
an affirmative defense. 65 The court held that litigants must plead
preemption as an affirmative defense because ERISA preemption
involves a choice of law.' 66 In In re HECI Exploration Co. v.

157. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55 (1987) (employee-benefit
action under ERISA must apply federal law and not state law); Local 174, Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962) (state court in an action by an
employee under LMRA must apply federal law and not local law).
158. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1497.
159. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
160. Gilchrist, 803 F.2d at 1497.
161. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
163. HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 1988); Dueringer
v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1988). But see Hayden v. TexasU.S. Chem. Co., 681 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (5th Cir. 1982) (trial court's neglect of ERISA
preemption, first raised at trial without notice to defendant, resulted in a remand to consider
the application of ERISA -for benefits due under total disability plan).
164. 842 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988).
In Dueringer, an insurer under a group medical plan was sued for denying an employee
coverage. Id. at 130. The fiduciary initially raised preemption unsuccessfully on appeal.
Id. at 130-31.
165. Id. at 130.
166. Id.
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Holloway, 167 the Fifth Circuit again held that ERISA preemption
was waived because it involves a choice of law and not a choice
of forum. 168 The court, however, determined that even if ERISA's
arbitrary and capricious standard were applied the fiduciary would
lose. 6 9 Therefore, the result would have been the same if the court
had recognized the nonwaivability of ERISA preemption in a
benefits-due lawsuit.
Four state courts have decided in a manner consistent with72
Gilchrist: Indiana, 170 Texas, 17 and California appellate courts,
and the Minnesota Supreme Court.' 7 All four held that a fiduciary
who initially raised ERISA preemption after trial or on appeal
74
waived it because it relates to a choice of law.
The California court also determined that the evidence was
insufficient to establish an ERISA plan.' 7 1 If the court had held
167. 862 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1988).
In Holloway, an employee-beneficiary sued for benefits due. Id. at 520. The fiduciary
removed the matter to its bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court neglected to apply
the arbitrary and capricious standard to determine the employee-beneficiary's right to
recover against the plan. Id. at 515-16. The fiduciary raised preemption initially on appeal.
Id. at 517.
168. Id. at 520. For the reduced authority of the multipoint opinion, see supra note
107.
169. Holloway, 862 F.2d at 523-25.
170. Associates Inv. Co. v. Claeys, 533 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. App. 1989) (without attribution).
In Claeys, an employee-beneficiary sued for profit-sharing benefits that the fiduciaries
had wrongly paid to a third party. Id. at 1249. The fiduciaries initially raised ERISA
preemption in their motion for a new trial (motion to correct errors). Id. at 1250. The
trial court entered judgment against the fiduciaries. Id.
171. Great N. Am. Stationers, Inc. v. Ball, 770 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
In Ball, employee-beneficiaries sued for profit-sharing benefits under state law. Id. at
632. The trial court entered judgment against the fiduciary. Id. The fiduciary raised ERISA
preemption for the first time on appeal. Id.
172. Hughes v. Blue Cross, 215 Cal. App. 3d 832, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989), cert.
dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990).
In Hughes, an employee-beneficiary sued for denied medical reimbursement. Id. at 852,
263 Cal. Rptr. at 865. The fiduciary raised ERISA preemption initially in its appellate
reply brief. Id. at 848, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
One California court of appeals distinguished Hughes on its facts, however, and considered ERISA preemption raised for the first time on appeal. Faria v. Northwestern Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 1134 n.2, 265 Cal. Rptr. 309, 312 n.2 (1989)
(reversing a bad faith insurance processing claim against an employee benefit plan).
173. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1989).
In Hubred, an employee-beneficiary sued for benefits denied under a health plan. Id. at
309. The fiduciary obtained a favorable judgment from the trial court, id., but did not
raise ERISA preemption until the appeal in support of the judgment. Id. at 310 n.l.
174. Hughes, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 851, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 861; Claeys, 533 N.E.2d at
1252; Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310 n.1; Ball, 770 S.W.2d at 632.
175. Hughes, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 857-59, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 865-67. For the reduced
authority of the multipoint opinion see supra note 107.
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ERISA preemption nonwaivable, the fiduciary would have lost
because it failed to prove that the plan was an ERISA plan.
The Minnesota Supreme Court cited an LMRA case 176 and a
non-benefits-due decision. 177 Because LMRA does not have a statutory preemption provision,17 LMRA waivability arises from different principles than the waivability of ERISA's express preemption
provision. 7 9 Under currently recognized principles, the waivability
in a non-benefits-due lawsuit differs from the waivability of a
benefits-due lawsuit in that jurisdiction lies in federal court, an
exclusive forum, and not both in federal and state court.' 0° The
fiduciary won under state law,' 8 l and the result would have been
the same if the court had recognized the nonwaivability of ERISA
preemption for a benefits-due lawsuit.
Although these state courts speak to ERISA preemption's waivability, their determinations do not constitute an independent
confirmation of the federal decisions arriving at the same conclusion. Through case law, many states provide that decisions of
federal courts on federal law bind state courts.8 2 Therefore, these
state courts recognized the Ninth Circuit's holding in Gilchrist as
binding.

III.

THE PREEMPTION PRINCIPLE

In International Longshoremen's Association v. Davis,8 3 an
NLRA preemption case, the Supreme Court reemphasized that

176. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310 n.10 (citing Johnson v. Armored Transport of Cal.,
Inc., 813 F.2d 1041, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1987)).
The authority of Johnson is doubtful because its waivability conclusion is based on an
ERISA case, Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986),
which does not recognize the differences between LMRA, which lacks a statutory preemption
provision, and ERISA, which does have a statutory preemption provision. See supra notes
38-48 and accompanying text.
177. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 310 n.1 (citing Amalgamated Cotton Garment & Allied
Indus. Fund v. Dion, 341 Pa. Super. 12, 15, 491 A.2d 123, 124 (1985)).
178. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985).
179. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
181. Hubred, 442 N.W.2d at 312. For the reduced authority of a multipoint opinion
see supra note 107.
182. See, e.g., Voelkel v. Tohulka, 236 Ind. 588, 594, 141 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 891 (National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940); Propper v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 237 Minn. 386, 394, 54 N.W.2d 840, 846 (1952) (Federal
Employers' Liability Act); Holmes v. Olson, 587 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex. 1979) (Truth in
Lending Act). But see People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 87, 460 P.2d 129, 132, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 460 (1969) (lower federal courts are not binding on federal questions, only
persuasive).
183. 476 U.S. 380 (1986); see supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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courts should use congressional intent to resolve federal preemption
disputes. The Supreme Court had discussed NLRA preemption in
an earlier case disputing an injunction granted under a state
statute.1 4 The Court determined that NLRA preemption was jurisdictional because the NLRB was the exclusive forum which
extinguished state jurisdiction and left the state court without
subject matter jurisdiction. 5 In dicta, the Court noted that NLRA
preemption did not involve a choice of law, as did a claim under
Section 301 of LMRA,1 6 but it made no statement concerning
nonwaivability of LMRA preemption.' s
Davis is the source of the choice-of-forum/choice-of-law distinction in ERISA preemption decisions. In Davis, however, the
Supreme Court also held that this distinction resulted from congressional intent for the NLRA as delineated in the Supreme
Court's prior opinions.188 The Court limited its decision to those
preemption claims that went to a state's actual adjudicatory power. 8 9
The Supreme Court was not deciding nonwaivability for other
types of preemption. In fact, the Supreme Court went on to state
that preemption under any other statute rested on the congressional
intent in enacting that statute.190 Therefore, the Davis holding does
not resolve preemption issues outside of a state's adjudicatory
power or under a statutory preemption provision.

In Davis, a stevedoring company fired a salaried supervisor for trying to unionize the
longshoremen. Id. at 382, 384. The union allegedly had told the supervisor that, if his
employer fired him, they would get his job back with back pay. Id. Legal precedent,
however, indicated that it is not an unfair labor practice to fire supervisors for union
activity. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 417
U.S. 790, 812 (1974). The supervisor then sued the union for fraud and misrepresentation
in Alabama state court. Davis, 476 U.S. at 386. The union defended under state law, not
raising NLRA preemption until its motion for judgment-notwithstanding-the-verdict. Id.
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the union had waived NLRA preemption because Alabama law required
defendants affirmatively to plead federal preemption. Id. at 386-87. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that the Alabama court had erred in deciding the case on this basis,
but affirmed on other grounds. Id. at 399-400.
184. See Local No. 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 548
(1963), cited in Davis, 476 U.S. at 390.
185. Davis, 476 U.S. at 392.
186. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988); see infra note 310 and accompanying text.
187. Davis, 476 U.S. at 391; see Curry, 371 U.S. at 548; Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (an employer sought damages under
state law as a result of a union striking in violation of a collective bargaining agreement).
188. Davis, 476 U.S. at 392 n.9.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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Courts subsequently applying Davis to other statutes have not
followed this clear direction' 91 or examined the congressional intent
for the statute. 92 Instead, courts have developed elaborate tests
for the choice-of-forum/choice-of-law distinction. One court outlined three types of preemption: one for choice of law in a case
properly before a state or federal court; one for claims such as
does not involve jurisdiction;
the LMRA Section 301 lawsuit, which
93
and one for the choice of forum.
Other than for implicit NLRA preemption, courts have used
Davis primarily as the basis for implicit preemption under LMRA

and explicit preemption under ERISA. 94 Several courts that considered LMRA preemption did not reach the waiver issue because
preemption was raised at the trial level, 95 and one court found no

191. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
192. New York's highest court examined legislative intent prior to Davis, 476 U.S. at
391. See Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1985); see
also Note, Preemption or Preservation of State Remedies under ERISA? The New York
Court of Appeals Preserves a State Remedy in Sasso v. Vachris, 60 ST. JOHNs L. REV.
567, 578-79 (1986).
193. See Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 834 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1987).
194. See supra notes 17 & 37 and accompanying text.
Courts have also considered the impact of InternationalLongshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis,
476 U.S. 380 (1986), on preemption under four other statutes without the waiver issue
before them. Under the Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926)
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-86 (1988)), federal preemption arose in two
district courts after removal from state court. Therefore, the litigants did not need to raise
the waiver issue. See Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburg & L.E.R.R., 858 F.2d
936, 943 (3d Cir. 1988) (because state action not found to encompass a federal cause of
action, federal court lacked jurisdiction under removal statute); Miller v. Norfolk & W.
Ry., 834 F.2d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 1987) (trial court did not resolve preemption question;
case remanded for determination).
Under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1988)), in a case without removal
jurisdiction, the court suggested that the petitioner should have argued preemption. See
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986). In a case under
the Federal Boat Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-75, 85 Stat. 213 (1971) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1451-89 (1988)) (with an express preemption provision), the Wisconsin
state court dealt with preemption which was raised for the first time in a postverdict motion
and treated it as if it related to subject matter jurisdiction, but found no preemption and
avoided the waiver issue. Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 146 Wis. 2d 604, 626, 432
N.W.2d 130, 139 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
195. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 1098,
1108 (6th Cir. 1986) (trustees suing for employer contributions to pension plan), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); Teamsters Local No. 429 Health & Welfare Fund v. Chain
Bike Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1337, 1341-43 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (trustees sued for employer
contribution to welfare plan both under LMRA and ERISA; court used the express language
of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (1985)); Sargent v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 167 Mich.
App. 29, 33, 421 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1988) (wrongful discharge).
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preemption and, therefore, did not consider the waiver issue. 196
When LMRA preemption was raised initially after trial or on
appeal, the courts discussed neither the meaning of LMRA pre197
emption nor its legislative intent. In an ERISA preemption case,
the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant had waived LMRA
preemption'9" without citing any difference between ERISA's express preemption provision and LMRA's implied preemption. On
the basis of NLRA cases, the Alabama Supreme Court found that
the fiduciary had not waived LMRA preemption.' 99 That case also
failed to note the jurisdictional differences between the two statutes. Because the Alabama court refused to recast the lawsuit as
an LMRA action, the plaintiff's claim consisted only of state
causes of action preempted by LMRA, and, therefore, the plaintiff
could not invoke the state court's subject matter jurisdiction. An
Illinois appellate court reached2 the same result based on a preDavis Seventh Circuit opinion. 00
Like the LMRA cases relying on Davis, ERISA preemption cases
have not reached the waiver issue because the defendant had raised
the matter at trial. 201 Several other courts, however, have dealt
with ERISA preemption raised initially on appeal. Instead of
exploring the legislative intent behind ERISA, these courts have
created a rule converse to the Supreme Court's NLRA rule, holding
that if the preemption merely involves a choice of law, the litigant
may waive it.202
196. National Can Corp. v. Jovanovich, 503 N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (Ind.
(employee sued for intentional tort of not assigning light duty for injured
197. Johnson v. Armored Transport of Cal. Inc., 813 F.2d 1041
(employee sued for wrongful discharge).
198. Id. at 1043-44.
The Johnson court determined that LMRA preemption was similar

Ct. App. 1987)
back).
(9th Cir. 1987)
to the ERISA

preemption considered in Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th

Cir. 1986). Both cases held that the fiduciary had waived preemption that was initially
raised in post-trial motions.
199. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays, 516 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala. 1987) (retaliatory discharge
and defamation; state court was without jurisdiction), vacated, 486 U.S. 1050 (1988).
200. Sagen v. Jewel Cos., 148 I11.App. 3d 447, 450, 499 N.E.2d 662, 664 (1986) (citing
National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986) (tortious interference with
employment contract, a collective bargaining agreement; raised for first time on appeal in
supplemental brief)).
201. Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(writ granted) (preemption raised in answers); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co., 752 S.W.2d 710,
713 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (writ granted) (preemption raised in pretrial discussions).
202. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986);
Hughes v. Blue Cross, 199 Cal. App. 3d 958, 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1988), reconsidered, 215
Cal. App. 3d 832, 263 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 2200 (1990);
Associates Inv. Co. v. Claeys, 533 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Great N. Am.
Stationers v. Ball, 770 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
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The failure to examine the congressional intent of the express
ERISA preemption provision compounds the error of these appellate courts when they apply Davis. The Davis case dealt with an
implicit preemption for which the courts will accommodate state

law. 20 3 Because ERISA preemption is an express preemption, the

courts can prevent encroachment by state law. 204 Therefore, a
holding on an implicit preemption is not necessarily relevant to an
express preemption.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

To determine whether ERISA preemption is jurisdictional, the
courts must first examine ERISA's express preemption provision

in light of preventing encroachment by state laws and promoting
uniformity. 25 Courts will normally inquire into legislative intent
to determine statutory meaning. 206 To achieve a just result, a court
uses different principles depending on the circumstances o'f the
case. 20 In statutory construction, courts employ two techniques:
the analytical or plain-meaning method, acting on the literal meaning of the words in the statute, and the teleological method, acting
20
on the intended legislative remedy.
In applying the analytical method, courts use only the statute
itself and intrinsic aids such as section headings, preambles, titles,
punctuation, context, grammar, and word choice. 201 This method

203. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 344-64 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50, 55
(1942) (the all-important controlling factor in determining the meaning of a statute is
legislative intent); United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 239 (1927) (same);
Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1925) (same); Wisconsin Cent. R.R. v. Forsyth, 159
U.S. 46, 55 (1895) (same)- Jones v. New York Guar. & Indem. Co., 101 U.S. 622, 626
(1879) (legislative intent is the law); Indianapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300
(1876) (same); Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 715 (1875) (same); United States v.
Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1867) (same); see also United States v. Cooper Corp.,
312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941) (role of the court is to declare the legislative intent); United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 610, 630 (1818) (same).
207. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960). See generally R.
UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 60-85 (1983) (discussing principles and
counterprinciples in contract law, such as the freedom to contract and fairness).
208. S. SMrrH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 86 (1973). The key difference between the two methods is the use of legislative history to interpret statutes.
209. See generally C. NUTTING, S. ELLIOT, & R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 471-508 (4th ed. 1969) [hereinafter C. NUTTING]. English courts have a definite
preference for the analytical method and eschew the use of extrinsic aids such as historical
legislative material. See Vacher & Sons, Ltd. v. London Soc'y of Compositors, [1913] App.

1991]

ERISA

PREEMPTION

determines not what the legislators meant to say, but the meaning
of what they did say. 210 Under the analytical method, the court
determines a statute's meaning through its exact language, using
intrinsic aids only if necessary.2 1 ' A court must enforce the statute
21 2
as written, even if the literal construction leads to unjust results.
Courts frequently weaken this method by combining it with the
teleological method. They create an ambiguous language exception
to the plain-meaning rule under which the court considers extrinsic
213
aids in addition to intrinsic aids.
Under the teleological method, courts use external aids, such as
other statutes, prior judicial and administrative decisions, historical
context, and legislative history. 21 4 In contrast to the analytical
method, a court examines the problem that the legislature set out

Cas. 107, 121-22. Two facets of the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary
explain the English courts' preference for the analytical method. See G. MARSHALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 74 (1971). First, the supremacy of Parliament over the other
branches of government encourages a belief in the sanctity of the exact words of the
statute. See Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REv. 388, 406-07 (1942).
Second, four aspects of the legislative process discourage a search for the legislative intent:
(1) a joint statutory effort of two legislative houses and the Crown obscures ascertaining
any single intent from the historical document, see G. MARSHALL, supra, at 74-75; (2) the
number of participants involved in the statute's passage renders valueless any single
member's opinion concerning the meaning, see Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 HARv. L. Rv. 417 (1899); (3) statements of the civil servant drafters contain bias, see
G. MARSHALL, supra, at 76; and (4) because a statute frequently results from compromise,
the legislators often confuse their intention with the language actually employed. See Hilder
v. Dexter, [1902] App. Cas. 474, 477 (Earl of Halsbury).
210. Dockers' Labour Club & Inst. Ltd. v. Race Relations Bd., [19741 3 All E.R. 592,
600 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale).
211. See, e.g., F. HORAK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 271-76 (1940); C.
NUTTIO, supra note 209, at 408.
212. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 521 (1981) (concerning
ERISA preemption "[ojur judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of
the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales."); F. HoRAK,
supra note 211, at 271-76 and 1059; C. NUTTING, supra note 209, at 408; see also Hill v.
East & W. India Dock Co., 9 App. Cas. 448, 465 (1884) (Lord Bramwell). English courts
follow this attitude even when facing ambiguous words. Commonwealth of Australia v.
Bank of New S. Wales, [1950] App. Cas. 235, 307.
213. See, e.g., F. HoRAK, supra note 211, at 271-76; C. NUTTING, supra note 209, at
408.
214. F. HoRAK, supra note 211, at 508-56. France, the United States, and the international community follow this latter approach. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27; M. PLANIOL, 1 TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE
DE Dkorr CIVIL 86 (1925); Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or
What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A. J. 535, 537-38 (1948).
In stark contrast, English common law forbids the courts to use the bill introducing the
act, Herron v. Rathmines & Rathgar Improvement Comm'rs, [1892] App. Cas. 498, 502;
speeches and debates on the bill or the fate of committee amendments, Warner v.
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to solve and the remedy it developed and then construes the statute
in light of achieving those ends. 215 This principle permits judges
to interpret statutes in a variety of ways. 216 Some courts treat this
method as an additional exception to the analytical method to
217 The United States Supreme
prevent unjust or absurd results.
211
methods.
both
used
Court has
In the case of ERISA's preemption and jurisdictional provisions,
both methods lead to the same conclusion.
A.

Intrinsic Aids

Regardless of the method used, the court's analysis ordinarily
starts with the statute itself following well-established canons of
statutory construction. 2 9 The analytical method is limited to these
canons. Unfortunately, use of only the canons is frequently not

Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1969] 2 App. Cas. 256, 279, [1968] 2 All E.R. 356, 367;
reports of Royal commissions or government committees, Black-Clawson Int'l Ltd. v.
Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G., [1975] App. Cas. 591, 615 [1975] 1 All E.R.
810, 815; the views of an administrative body concerned with administering the act, London
City Council v. Central Land Bd., [1959] Ch. 386, 392, [1958] 3 All E.R. 676, 678 or
views of the draftsman, Hilder v. Dexter, [1902] App. Cas. 475, 477.
215. See, e.g., F. HoRaiK, supra note 211, at 268-71, 1059; C. NUTTING, supra note
209, at 408-09. The teleological method derives from Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b,
76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584) (Sir Edward Coke).
216. See C. BowEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 261-62 (1956) (King James I's statements
about Sir Edward Coke's idea concerning statutory interpretation by judges); see also
Magor & St. Mellons Rural Dist. Council v. Newport Corp., [1952] App. Cas. 189, 191
(Lord Denning's approach of filling in the gaps and making sense of the statute by
supplementing the written word by considering the legislative and ministerial intent criticized
as "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin guise of interpretation").
217. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
218. Compare Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443, 446 (1924) (if the language is plain
and an injustice arises, the remedy lies with Congress and not the courts) and Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (if the language is plain and unambiguous, the
duty of interpretation does not arise and the court need not discuss the aids for resolving
ambiguity) with Church of the Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459 (statutes should be sensibly
construed so that the reason of the law prevails over its letter if an injustice or absurdity
would result) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 560 (1967) (teleological method; suggesting
Sir Edward Coke's rule in Heydon's Case).
219. See, e.g., Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 307 (1938). Even the canons have
principles and counter principles. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 521-35. As a
result, a declaration of the legislative intent can overcome a canon of construction. See,
e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336 (1981) (the starting point for interpreting
a statute is the language of the statute itself; "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive");
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 661 (1829) (technical rule must yield to the
expression of the will of the legislature); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797)
(same).
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determinative because different canons occasionally provide conflicting results, 220 and due to the lack of a hierarchy among the
canons, 221 judges frequently speculate on legislative intent when
222
selecting the proper canon.

220. See Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation:A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431,
443 (1989).
The English Race Relations Act of 1968 (RRA), ch. 71, repealed by the Race Relations
Act of 1976, ch. 74, § 79, provides an example of this conflict. (An English statute is
preferable for this purpose because the English court uses the analytical method more
strenuously than American courts.) The first RRA case to reach the House of Lords dealt
with whether the act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "national origin" included
discrimination on the basis of changeable national citizenship. London Borough of Ealing
v. Race Relation Bd., [1972] App. Cas. 342, [1972] 1 All E.R. 105 (1971), rev'g [1971]
Q.B. 309, [1970] 1 All E.R. 424.
One canon presumes that a specific proviso excludes unmentioned situations from the
act that otherwise would come within its scope. See Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey, 5
Q.B.D. 170, 173 (1880). Because the RRA has two sections exempting some discrimination
on nationality grounds, RRA, §§ 8(11), 27(9), the term "national origin" would include
"nationality." See Ealing, [1971] 1 All E.R. at 435.
Another canon requires interpreting statutes that limit common-law freedoms narrowly
in favor of the freedom. In re Cuno, 43 Ch. D. 12, 17 (1889). Because race discrimination
was lawful prior to the RRA, the term "national origin" would be limited to citizenship
by birth. Ealing, [1971] 1 All E.R. at 435 (Swanwick, J., noting the conflict and the
absence of direction on which governs).
221. See Posner, supra note 220, at 443.
The RRA again provides an example. In the ex abundanti cautela canon the court
presumes that the legislature included an exception clause to prevent an incident related to
the enacting clause from escaping the judges' notice. See Wakefield Local Bd. of Health
v. West Riding & Grimsby Ry., L.R. 1 Q.B. 84, 85 (1865). The excepting proviso of the
RRA also provides an exception for residence, which lies without the ambit of the RRA.
RRA, §§ 1(1), 27(9)(a). The RRA's excepting proviso expressed the draftsman's cautiousness
by including more in the saving clause than is absolutely necessary. Ealing, [1972] 1 All
E.R. at 109 (Lord Donovan), 112 (Viscount Dilhorne), 115 (Lord Simon), 118 (Lord Cross).
222. See Posner, supra note 220, at 443 (no one has suggested a satisfactory ordering
of the canons).
With respect to the RRA, Viscount Dilhorne confirmed his interpretation by speculating
that if Parliament had intended to include nationality within the discrimination definition
it could have easily added the words "or nationality" after "national origins." Ealing,
[1972] 1 All E.R. at 113. This approach overlooks the possibility that members of Parliament
thought "national origins" included "nationality," making the addition superfluous. Lord
Cross also confirmed his interpretation by speculating that Parliament used "national
origins" and not "nationality" because nationality based on citizenship did not include
British subjects against whom violators practiced discrimination, whereas national origins
based on birth did. Id. at 117. This interpretation overlooks the possibility that "colour,
race or ethnic . . . origins" includes the type of discrimination Lord Cross had in mind.
At best, these canons provide a checklist for the judge to consult before determining the
meaning of a statute. Posner, supra note 220, at 443. One such checklist was prepared by
Professor Llewellyn. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 522-25.
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Statutory Language

The only statutory language the courts should need to construe
lies in the ERISA preemption provision, Section 514:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 231003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.1

Some courts, however, have also felt a need to examine the ERISA
jurisdictional provision, Section 502(e), 224 which provides that nonbenefits-due actions must be brought in federal court and benefits-

due actions may be brought in either federal or state court. 225 Only
those courts that fail to distinguish between implicit and express

preemption have given significance to the jurisdictional provision.
These courts have used the jurisdictional provision to create a

choice-of-law preemption, which only relates to implicit preemption.
2.

Plain Meaning

The Supreme Court primarily applies the plain-meaning rule: in
the absence of ambiguity in a statute's wording, the statute's
explicit terms express the legislative intent. 226 Ambiguity is an

223. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1985 & Supp. 1987).
The saving clause exceptions in § 1144(b) generally apply to: pre-ERISA matters; state
regulation of insurance, banking, and securities; the use of state facilities by the Department
of Labor; criminal laws of general applicability; the Hawaiian Prepaid Health Care Act;
fully-insured, multiple welfare arrangements; qualified domestic relation orders; and nonexclusion of welfare plan coverage due to social security coverage.
The exemptions in § 1003(b) generally relate to: governmental plans; most church plans;
plans maintained only to comply with applicable worker's compensation laws; plans
maintained outside the United States primarily to benefit nonresident aliens; and unfunded,
excess-benefit plans.
224. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988).
225. Section 502(e) states:
Except for actions under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section, the district courts
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this
subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.
State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States
shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this
section.
Id.
226. See, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating the analytical
construction principle); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, I II S. Ct. 478, 482-83
(1990) (applying the plain-meaning rule to the ERISA preemption provision); FMC Corp.
v. Holliday, I1 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) (same); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
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imprecise word that can permit a court to use the extrinsic aids
when it chooses. 227 The discussion in this subsection assumes the
absence of any ambiguity or use of extrinsic aids.
A court should begin by examining the plain meaning of the
wording of ERISA's express preemption. Under the plain-meaning
canon, the words are given their commonly attributed meaning. 228
The plain meaning is usually obtained from the contemporary
edition of a respected dictionary, for example, Black's Law Dictionary or Webster's New InternationalDictionary.229

41, 50 (1987) (same); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985)
(applying the plain-meaning rule to the savings clause of the ERISA preemption provision);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983) (same); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (if the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 484 (1981) (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (ordinarily it is not necessary to look beyond the words of a statute, into
the legislative history, in order to ascertain the meaning of a statute); United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 122 (1980) (absent clear evidence of a contrary legislative
intention, a statute should be interpreted according to its plain language). But see Train v.
Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (courts should consider
legislative history even if the language of the statute is clear). See generally Murphy, Old
Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 CoLtui. L. REv. 1299 (1975) (analyzing cases in which the Supreme
Court only appeared to give weight to the rule and other cases where federal courts followed
Caminetti, 242 U.S. 470, in its full rigor).
For criticism of the plain-meaning rule see Posner, supra note 220, at 442 (the rule is
unnecessary; competent judges do not need grammar handbooks, incompetent judges are
unable to apply them). See generally Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning
Rule, 4 DAY. L. REv. 31 (1979).
227. See White, Promise Fulfilled and PrincipleBetrayed, 1988 ANN. Sutrv. AM. L. 7,
21 (reconciling Karl Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code with Legal Realism by intentionally using the imprecise words "unconscionable" and "good faith" to allow judges to
derive an equitable result without torturing an accepted rule of law).
228. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983) (when a statute does
not define a term, Jthe court must start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
182 (1981) (in cases of statutory construction, begin with the language of the statute, and,
unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted according to their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning); see also Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1947);
Rosenman v. United States, 323 U.S. 658 (1944); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323
U.S. 490 (1944); Levy v. M'Cartee, 31 U.S. (6. Pet.) 102 (1932); cf. UNIF. STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 513 (1980).
229. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983) (using WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S 3d], RANDOM
HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979), and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th
ed. 1979)); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 n.16 (1983) (using BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) for the ERISA preemptive provision).
The Supreme Court has indicated that a court should not apply a dictionary mechanically
in unintended contexts, but only when using the teleological method. See Farmers Reservoir
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The key terms in the ERISA preemption provision are: the
introductory proviso ,230 "shall," "supersede," "State laws," "insofar," "relate to," and "employee benefit plans." Because the
introductory proviso and the phrases "State laws," "relate to,"
and "employee benefit plan" concern substantive law, they are
less important for dealing with the procedural aspects of state law
231
survivability. Moreover, the statute defines two of these terms,
and the Supreme Court has initiated the investigation of the other
two •232
"Shall" indicates a mandatory requirement.233 "Supersede" commonly means: "(2) to make void or useless . . . by superior power
•.. ; to cause to be set aside; to force out of use ... ; to render
obsolete; to cause to be abandoned. (3) to take the place .. .of;
'234
to replace. (4) to displace . . . or make way for another.

& Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 764 (1948) (citing Hand, J.,using the
teleological method, in Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 326
U.S. 404 (1945)).
The Third Circuit has advocated that Congress intended the dictionary meaning when
drafting the ERISA preemption provision. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d
1238, 1250 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 740 (1985) (giving the ERISA preemption provision its "broad common-sense meaning"); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983) (relying on legislative
history and the "normal sense of the phrase" to interpret the ERISA preemption provision).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) ("Except as provided in subsection(b)...)".
231. Id. §§ 1002(3), 1144(c)(1) (employee benefit plan, state laws). One statutory
construction canon binds courts to use definitions and rules of interpretation contained in
the statute. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 523 (Canon no. 9).
232. The Supreme Court has determined that "relates to" means "has a connection to
or reference to." See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (using BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 229; see also Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv. Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988)
(Georgia garnishment law does not relate to a welfare plan); Fort Halifax Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (Maine severance pay statute does not relate); Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (Mississippi bad-faith claims-processing does
relate); Metropolitan Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (Massachusetts statute requiring
minimum health care relates); cf. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(New Jersey worker's compensation statute prohibiting benefit offset relates).
The Supreme Court has also determined that certain laws regulate insurance within the
introductory proviso. See Pilot Life Ins., 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (Mississippi bad-faith claimsprocessing not saved from preemption); Metropolitan Life Ins., 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(Massachusetts statute requiring minimum health care saved).
233. See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1934); United States ex rel. Siegel
v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 359-60 (1895). Contra West Wis. Ry. v. Foley, 94 U.S. 100
(1876) (only in relation to other parts of the statute).
Another statutory construction canon requires courts to use definitions determined prior
to the statute's passage. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 524 (Canon no. 13).
234. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2533 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter WEBSTER's 2d]; see also WEBSTER's 3d, supra note 229, at 2295.
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"Insofar" commonly means "to such an extent or degree. ' 235 This
straight-forward reasoning indicates that ERISA has eliminated
state law to the extent that "it relate[s] to any employee benefit
plan. ' 236 Therefore, because this area of substantive state law no
longer exists, it cannot give a court jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit's construction of this section in Gilchrist231
conflicts with the ERISA preemption provision's plain meaning.
Although the plain meaning eliminates all state law, the court
would permit substantive state law to apply in some benefits-due
lawsuits. The conflict arises from the Ninth Circuit's treatment of
ERISA's express preemption as an implicit preemption. In Davis,
the Supreme Court created NLRA preemption on the basis of an
implied legislative intent, not on a judicially-perceived conflict
between state and federal labor law. If the Court had created
ERISA preemption in this manner, the courts might be free to
determine ERISA preemption's limits. 238 Instead, Congress created
ERISA preemption by express statutory language. Therefore, courts
should act to prevent state law encroachment on ERISA's uniform
federal common law rather than accommodate the least possible
displacement of state law.
The legislative intent expressed in the language of this statute
should not lead to a split between lawsuits brought in federal and
state courts or between non-benefits-due and benefits-due lawsuits. 239 Under the plain-meaning rule, ERISA preempts all state
laws at all times. Nowhere does the statute suggest a distinction
based on the type of lawsuit or the forum.
Another statutory construction canon suggests that a court cannot construe ERISA to preempt state law only when the litigants
do not waive preemption in a particular type of lawsuit or forum.
The canon, contrary to the plain-meaning rule, provides an exception to plain meaning when the literal interpretation leads to
absurdities, "mischievous consequences," or thwarts the statute's
purpose.m For ERISA preemption, however, it is not the plainmeaning result that leads to absurd results but the waiver concept.

235. WEBSTER's 3d, supra note 229, at 1170; WEBSTER'S 2d, supra note 234, at 1286.
236. This is clearly the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the meaning of "supersede."
See City of Los Angeles v. Gurdane, 59 F.2d 161, 163 (9th Cir. 1932) ("supersede" in a
statute means " '[s]et aside;' 'annul;' 'displace;' 'make void, inefficacious, or useless;'
'repeal' " or that "there is not much left of the existing").
237. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
238. Cf. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (court to determine extent and
nature of implied action for proxy violation from federal policy underlying statute).
239. See supra notes 36, 54 & 101 and accompanying text.
240. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 524 (Canon no. 12).
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It is far easier for courts to apply a uniform rule that is applicable
to all ERISA actions than to first analyze the type of lawsuit or
available forum. The latter approach creates multiple bodies of
employee benefit law, one for nonwaiver and several for waiver
of ERISA preemption. This bifurcation undermines the preemption
provision's purpose of encouraging the growth of private-employer,
24

employee-benefit plans through uniformity of law. '
Permitting waiver of preemption also violates several other statutory construction canons. The waiver situation effectively creates
a new implied proviso for Section 514 of ERISA. One canon
requires a court to construe a proviso narrowly to exclude any
situation that is not contained in the specific wording. 242 Another
canon forbids a court to read an exception like waiver into the

statute. 243 Under yet another canon, the express statement of a
proviso excludes the creation of a new proviso. 2" Still another
canon requires the court to give meaning to every word in the
statute.2 4 This does not, however, authorize a court to create a
waiver exception through the jurisdiction provision because as that
provision merely designates jurisdiction for lawsuits arising under
ERISA.

241. See 29 U.S.C. § lOOla(c)(2) (1988) (purpose of the multiemployer plan amendments
to ERISA is to prevent discouraging their growth); see also id. § 1001(a) (congressional
findings that employee-benefit plans are important to the security of millions of Americans,
to the stability of labor, and to the continuity of interstate commerce suggest a purpose
to foster the growth of those plans); cf. infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text (growth
purpose also evidenced extrinsically).
242. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 528 (Canon no. 28); cf. infra note 332 (ERISA
extrinsic evidence indicates a court should construe the exceptions narrowly). The counter
canon provides an equitable exception, but waiver does not treat the "waiving" party
equitably. The nonwaiver situation is far less inequitable because the losing litigant may
retry the case under ERISA. See, e.g., supra notes 119, 122, 135, 137 & 145. The only
potential inequity is additional litigation costs. The plaintiff, however, created those costs
attempting to avoid ERISA, and the defendant is generally the beneficiary of nonwaiver.
243. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 526 (Canon no. 19).
Under ERISA, courts generally have not followed this canon. For example, when
considering preemption of marital property law, courts have found an implied exception
or irrebuttable presumption against preemption. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment for alimony and support); Stone v.
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1928), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981) (community property laws); see also Kilberg & Inman, supra
note 39, at 1320-21.
Congress finally resolved this problem in the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 93-397, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (1984), creating an express provision for qualified
domestic relations orders and clarifying the preemption in other family law areas. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056 (1988).
244. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 207, at 526 (Canon no. 20).
245. Id. at 525 (Canon no. 16).
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Therefore, any state or federal court that relies solely on state
law for jurisdiction when reviewing a claim that "relate[s] to any
employee benefit plan," will lack subject matter jurisdiction because ERISA supersedes that state law. The only way a state court
could obtain subject matter jurisdiction would be if the plaintiff
amended the petition to include the appropriate ERISA action,
which would invoke ERISA's jurisdictional provision. The effect
of holding that ERISA preemption can be waived is either: (1) to
recognize ERISA for purposes of asserting jurisdiction, then deny
its existence for purposes of conducting the lawsuit; 246 or (2) to
interpret the jurisdictional provision as an exception to the preemption provision although the language of the preemption provision explicitly excludes exceptions.24 7 Neither method is condoned
by the Supreme Court.
B.

Extrinsic Aids

Under the plain-meaning method, a court must find an ambiguity
in the words of the statute before it can examine extrinsic aids to
interpretation. 248 Under the teleological method, the explicit words
are not a barrier to the examination of extrinsic aids. 249
Commentators have suggested several ambiguities in ERISA. For
example, the key word in the preemption provision, "supersede,"
is ambiguous because a court could interpret it narrowly or
broadly. 2 0 The narrow interpretation would limit the effect to only
those statutes that actually conflict with ERISA. 251 Conversely, the

246. This idea runs counter to the procedure for cases tried on the wrong theory. See,
e.g., supra notes 119, 122, 135, 137 & 145.
247. See supra note 243.
248. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has adopted this
rule with respect to legislative history, the primary extrinsic aid discussed in this Article.
See, e.g., Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937) (legislative history cannot
compel a construction at variance with the plain words of the statute); Fairport, P. &
E.R.R. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589 (1934) (if the statute is unambiguous, consideration of
legislative history is not permissible); Wilbur v. United States, 284 U.S. 231 (1931) (same).
249. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
250. See Brummond, FederalPreemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA,
62 IowA L. REV. 57, 67 (1976) (suggesting "supersede" is narrower than "preempt");
Manno, supra note 10, at 60 (describing the two meanings the same as for court-implied
preemption; see supra notes 39 & 40).
251. See Brummond, supra note 250. One court rejected the narrow interpretation,
deciding that "supersede" in § 514 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988), means
"preempt". Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287, 1302 (2d Cir. 1981),
modified sub nom., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
The Supreme Court chose this narrow approach when it first defined "relate to," but it
later moved to a broad interpretation. Compare Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504 (1981) with Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
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broad interpretation would eliminate a whole statute that only
tangentially touched on ERISA. 252 Another ambiguity exists because "insofar as" implies that preemption applies only to the
application of the state law, but "relate to" implies preemption
of the state law itself. 53 In addition, a court could interpret "relate
to" broadly to eliminate state laws that regulate areas traditionally
left to state governance if such laws impose substantive requirements on an ERISA plan; or it could interpret "relate to" narrowly
which could permit states to impose requirements on plans under
254
the guise of regulating other matters.

For purposes of this subsection, this Article will assume that
either an ambiguity exists or the teleological method otherwise
applies. This assumption leads to the consideration of extrinsic
aids, in particular the legislative history,
which is the preferred
25
extrinsic aid of the Supreme Court. 1
Use of extrinsic aids is often not decisive because different
extrinsic aids frequently lead to different results. 2 6 In addition,

252. Brummond, supra note 250, at 67; see also Hirsch, supra note 40, at 516.
253. See Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law under ERISA, 1979 DUKE
L.J. 383, 389.
254. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CGi. L. REv. 23, 53 (1978).
255. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976)
(courts can and should consider legislative history even where the language of the statute
is clear); see also United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (when
the statute is ambiguous, may use legislative history); United States v. Missouri P.R.R.,
278 U.S. 269, 278 (1928) (same).
256. Again, the RRA provides an example. The problem in London Borough of Ealing
v. Race Relation Bd., [1972] App. Cas. 342, [1972] 1 All E.R. 105 (1971), was to determine
whether discrimination on the basis of "national origins" in the RRA included changeable
national citizenship. See supra note 220.
One extrinsic aid is the examination of statutes that are in pari materia with the statute
in question. Because legislative draftsmen do not change the wording of a statute unless
they intend a different meaning, the court may glean a statute's meaning by comparing its
language with earlier, related statutes. Hadley v. Perks, L.R. I Q.B. 444, 457 (1866). The
earlier act, the Race Relations Act of 1965, ch. 73, used the term "national origin," id.
§§ 1(1), 5(1), 6(1), but not "nationality" as did the RRA. See RRA, §§ 8(11), 27(9).
Moreover, the earlier statute had a long title indicating that it prohibited "racial discrimination." Ealing, [1972] 1 All E.R. at 111. Using the statutory interpretive canon which
allows a court to consult statute titles to resolve ambiguities, see K. LLEWELLYN, supra
note 207, at 524 (Counter-Canon no. 11), Viscount Dilhorne concluded that "national
origin" meant "racial origin." Ealing, [1972] 1 All E.R. at 111. Using statutes in pari
materia, he further concluded "nationality" did not possess the same meaning as "national
origin," and, therefore, the law permitted discrimination on the basis of citizenship. Ealing,
[1972] 1 All E.R. at 111-12.
There is a counter-principle to in pari materia, however, holding that the legislature
changed the words without intending to change the meaning in an attempt to improve the
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one extrinsic aid, consideration of the result, permits voiding the
result obtained through the use of the statutory interpretation

canons .257
1.

Legislative History

In the years before the passage of ERISA, congressional committees heard much testimony about the proposed scope of ERISA
preemption. 25 8 Some witnesses advocated broad preemption to avoid
chaotic, dual regulation. 25 9 Other witnesses urged cooperative federal and state regulation. 26° While both favored some type of
ERISA preemption, the House and Senate developed different
proposals. 26' Earlier versions of the preemption provision contained

style and avoid using the same words over and over. Hadley v. Perks, L.R. 1 Q.B. 444,
457 (1866).
Viscount Dilhorne also consulted a treatise: A. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 645
(8th ed. 1955). When statutes contain terms of art, the court may refer to treatises that
would show the sense of the words when the legislature passed the statute. In re Castiori,
[1981] 1 Q.B. 149. Contrary to his earlier conclusion, Viscount Dilhorne discovered that
"nationality" included both race and citizenship. Ealing, [1972] 1 All E.R. at 111-12. If
he had consulted a different source, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/C 3/SR. 1304 (1969), he would have
discovered that "national origins" has no international meaning, according to the Convention. Id.
257. When a phrase is capable of two or more interpretations, one of which leads to
an enormous inconvenience or injustice, the court may give the statute whichever construction causes the least inconvenience. Reid v. Reid, 31 Ch. D. 402, 407 (1886).
In his Ealing dissent, Lord Kilbrandon thought that this test had been met. Ealing,
[1972] 1 All. E.R. 119-20. A sign saying "No Poles admitted" would not put anyone on
notice of whether the violator discriminated against Polish nationals or against persons of
Polish origin.
258. See generally Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (N.D. Cal.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
259. E.g., Statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFLCIO, Hearings on H.R. 5741 (Proposed Welfare and Pension Plan Protection Act) before
the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 186 (1968); Statement by Preston C. Basset on behalf of Towers,
Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc., Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 (Proposed Revisions
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act) before the General Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 315 (1973);
Statement of Lauren Upson, Member, California Banker's Association Committee on
Employee Benefit Trusts, Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462, supra, pt. 2, at 651.
260. E.g., Statement of Robert D. Haase, Commissioner of Insurance, State of Wisconsin, Hearings on H.R. 5741, supra note 259, at 338; Statement of John P. Thompson
for The Southland Corporation, Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462, supra note 259, pt.
1, at 554-55; Statement of Stanley C. DuRose, Jr., Commissioner of Insurance of the State
of Wisconsin, Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462, supra note 259, pt. 2, at 188-95.
261. See generally Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. at 1298.
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narrower forms of preemption, 262 which would have limited preemption to the substantive areas actually covered by the Act and
to particular types of plans. 263 The Ford administration proposed
a similar preemption provision and requested that the provision
state clearly that the states could not set minimum standards for
the aspects of retirement plans listed in the statute, but could set
standards in other areas such as tax aspects. 264
The conference committee, however, discarded both the Senate
and House limited versions and the administration's version of the
ERISA preemption provision. In their place, the conference committee substituted an expanded preemption provision reaching all
state laws relating to employee benefit plans, not just state laws
governing the regulated substantive areas. 265 Statements made in
the House and Senate debates that preceded enactment of the
conference committee's version of ERISA preemption indicate that
both houses believed that the conference committee's change was
intended to be the broadest possible preemption following the
procedures of LMRA preemption. 266 This broad preemption would
create a uniform federal common law regulating employee benefit
267
plans.
Courts that have ruled on the waivability of ERISA preemption
have not examined the legislative history, perhaps because it does
not speak specifically to waiver or procedural laws. These courts

have relied on two preemption presumptions. First, a court should

262. See generally Kilberg & Heron, supra note 253, at 390.
263. See, e.g., S.4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a) (as introduced Jan. 4, 1973); H.R. 2,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 699 (as passed by the Senate on Mar. 4, 1974); id. § 514 (as passed
by the House on Feb. 28, 1974) ("shall supersede any and all laws of the States and
political subdivision thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the reporting
and disclosure responsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of
any employee benefit plans .... "); 120 CONo. REC. 4742 (1974); S. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 699 (as passed by the Senate on Sept. 19, 1973) ("shall supersede any and all laws
of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act"); 120 CoNo. REc. 5005 (1974); H.R.
2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (as introduced Jan. 3, 1973); see also, Hewlett-Packard, 425
F. Supp. at 1298 n.13, 14 (wording of H.R. 2 as enacted by the House on Feb. 28, 1974;
different wording of H.R. 2 as enacted by the Senate on Mar. 4, 1974); Turza & Halloway,
Preemption of State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
28 CATH. L. REV. 163, 167 n.22 (1979).
264. See Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees of H.R.
2 to Provide for Pension Reform, reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 5145.
265. Kilberg & Heron, supra note 253, at 390.
266. See infra notes 271-320 & 323-43 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 344-64 and accompanying text.
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presume that there is no express preemption if the subject matter
is traditionally subject to state regulation.268 Traditionally, procedure is an area subject to state formulation. 26 9 Second, a court
should presume that there is no express preemption of a state law
unless Congress explicitly considered that type of state law. 70 While
legislative history does not specifically mention waiver of preemption, the following items of legislative history can overcome these
two presumptions.
2.

The LMRA Practice

Courts generally use committee reports to confirm statutory
construction 27' or to determine the meaning of ambiguous language. 272 The conference committee report on ERISA 273 detailed
the procedural rules for the nongovernmental, civil enforcement
provision in both breach of fiduciary duty and benefits-due suits.
That conference committee report states that all actions related to
ERISA plans "in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as
arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to
those brought under section 301 of" LMRA. 274 This confirms the
plain-meaning construction of the statute and indicates that the
benefits-due lawsuit, the only one that is triable in state court, is
in state court only under federal law. Therefore, a state court
could not hold that a party has waived ERISA preemption and

268. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) (dealing
with the savings clause of the ERISA preemption provision); Kilberg & Inman, supra note
39, 1326; Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: the Meaning of "Relate to" in Section
514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143, 164-65 (1980).
269. Federal courts sitting in diversity actions follow some state procedural rules to
avoid forum shopping. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)
(statute of limitations); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)
(conflict of law); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 238 (1940) (accrual of
the cause of action); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210 (1939) (burden of
proof). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965) (federal court will not
follow state rules nullifying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (federal court will not look to state law
for jury rules), overruled on other grounds, Hanna, 380 U.S. 460.
270. See Hirsch, supra note 40, at 538-49.
271. Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502 (1962); McLean v. United States, 226
U.S. 374, 380 (1912); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 610 (1869), overruled
on other grounds, Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870).
272. Wright v. Vinton Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937); United States
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
474 (1921).
273. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 30.
274. Id. at 5107; see supra note 18 and accompanying text for LMRA litigation practice.
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then proceed to hear the lawsuit under state law. Furthermore,
the committee report reveals that Congress did consider the preemption of state procedural rules concerning ERISA plans.
Senator Harrison Williams, Jr., then Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 275 a cosponsor of the
original draft legislation containing a subject-matter preemption
provision, 2 6 and the floor manager of the bill, 277 confirmed the
scope of ERISA preemption by suggesting that the courts treat
such actions in the same fashion as LMRA cases. 271 Courts often
treat the explanations of committee reports made by a committee
member or the committee chairman as supplemental committee
reports .279 The Supreme Court used this legislative history in applying the preemption removal rules of LMRA practice to ERISA
cases. 2 0 Under LMRA, the courts also create a uniform federal
common law, in which state law is a source of potentially compatible rules, not an independent source of litigable private rights. 21
LMRA may differ from ERISA as to what law is preempted
because LMRA lacks an express preemption provision and, therefore, has no savings clause. 2 2 To determine what procedural rules
apply to ERISA preemption, courts should examine LMRA preemption procedure.

275. Note, Recent Decisions, 27 DuQ. L. Rav. 783, 795 (1989).
276. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985); Manno,
supra note 10, at 61.
277. Irish & Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109, 113 (1985).
278. See 120 CoNo. Rac. S29,933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5188-89. "It is intended that such [ERISA] actions will
be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act .... " Id.
279. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475-77 (1921); see also
Wright v. Vinton Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 459 (1937) (explanations given in
Congress make meaning plain); Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312, 322
(1934) (chairman of committee so stated); United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S.
269, 278 (1929) (statements by those in charge); Railroad Comm'n. v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922) (explanatory statements of members in charge); United
States v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918) (remarks in nature of supplementary
report); United States v. Coca Cola Co., 241 U.S. 265, 281 (1916) (chairman explaining
the provision).
280. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-67 (1987) (benefitsdue lawsuit); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557,
560 n.2 (1968) (Courts will consider LMRA preemption alleged in the answer part of the
complaint for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint doctrine for determining removal for
a federal cause of action).
281. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
282. See Sherrich, ERISA Preemption: An Introduction, 64 MICH. B.J. 1074, 1078-79
(1985).
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The Supreme Court's characterization of Section 301 of LMRA
23
as an example of a preemption that involves a choice of law
could mean that courts considering LMRA preemption should find
it waivable for this reason. Most courts, however, have followed
the Supreme Court's directive to eschew the choice-of-law/choiceof-forum distinction under LMRA, 214 and they agree on the nonwaivability of LMRA preemption. Six courts have decided nongovernmental, civil actions involving LMRA preemption raised
initially after trial or on appeal. Five courts held that the litigant
had not waived LMRA preemption, and the sixth determined that
the litigant had waived preemption.
a.

Nonwaivable

The Sixth and Seventh Circuits and state courts in Illinois and
Alabama have decided that when a litigant initially raises LMRA
preemption on appeal, the litigant has not waived preemption.
Both state and federal courts can assert jurisdiction over both
benefits-due and non-benefits-due lawsuits under LMRA. 28 5 Unlike
the ERISA cases, the LMRA nonwaivability cases do not consider
whether the court would have had jurisdiction under LMRA if the
plaintiff had pled it. These courts may believe that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck 28 6 mandates this
result. Under Lueck, when a state claim depends substantially on
analyzing a collective bargaining agreement, the court must treat

the claim as a Section 301 claim or dismiss

it.287

Unless it recasts

the state lawsuit as an LMRA lawsuit, the court lacks jurisdiction
over the state claim due to LMRA preemption.
Another reason the courts give for finding nonwaivability of
LMRA preemption is the federal policy seeking uniformity in the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. The Supreme
2
Court cited this reason for recognition of LMRA preemption 11
when, as with NLRA, the statute lacked an express preemption
provision. Although ERISA has an express provision, it embodies
28 9
the same policy of uniformity in the law.

283. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391 (1986).
284. Id. at 391 n.9.
285. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
286. 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
287. Id.
288. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 (1988) ("[Section]
301 mandated resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of
collective-bargaining agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent resolution
of labor-management disputes.")
289. See infra notes 344-64 and accompanying text.
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In National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 29° the Seventh Circuit noted
that preemption is usually an affirmative defense which litigants
waive unless they plead. 29' There are exceptions to this rule,
however, other than subject matter jurisdiction, such as federal
policy grounds. 292 The strong public policy underlying Section 301
requires applying uniform federal principles to the interpretation
of collective bargaining contracts. 293 McNeil, however, involved a
multipoint opinion in which the court also found NLRA preemption.29 The court refused to address ERISA preemption to avoid
295
further weakening the LMRA holding.
In Apponi v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. ,296 the Sixth Circuit followed
McNeil and observed that a compelling federal policy favored a
uniform application of federal law to enforce labor contracts. 297
The court noted that the rule in Lueck mandated its refusal to
recognize a waiver of the preemption.2 98
In Sagen v. Jewel Cos., Inc. ,29 an Illinois appellate court also
followed McNeil. 300 The court determined that LMRA preemption

290. 784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
291. Id. at 825-26.
In McNeil, an employer sought a declaratory judgment that a state statute concerning
payments to a vacation plan under a collective bargaining agreement was preempted by
LMRA, NLRA, and ERISA. Id. at 820. Judge Posner addressed only LMRA and NLRA.
The defendant had not raised LMRA preemption in the trial court other than under the
rubric of federal labor law, mentioning specifically only NLRA. Id. at 825. The appellate
court reversed and directed the trial court to enter the declaration desired by the employer.
Id. at 829.
292. Id. at 825-36; see, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 119, 121 (1976) ("We
announce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate
court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution
is beyond any doubt ... or where 'injustice might otherwise result' ....
); Capitol Indem.
Corp. v. Keller, 717 F.2d 324, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (for serious and sensitive
issues of federalism or plain error).
293. McNeil, 784 F.2d at 825-26.
294. Id. at 826-29. See supra note 107 for weakened authority of multipoint opinions.
295. McNeil, 784 F.2d at 822-23.
296. 809 F.2d 1210 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
In Apponi, employees sued for benefits due under a pension plan subject to a collective
bargaining agreement for pre-ERISA service. Id. at 1213. The employer failed to raise
LMRA preemption until the second appeal. Id. at 1215. The court remanded for jury trial
on those elements of LMRA law not previously considered. Id. at 1217, 1220.
297. Id. at 1215.
298. Id.
299. 148 Ill. App. 3d. 447, 499 N.E.2d 662 (1986).
In Sagen, an employee sued for tortious interference with her union-negotiated employment contract. Id. at 449, 499 N.E.2d at 663. The employer first raised preemption by
supplemental brief before the appellate court. Id.
300. Id. at 450, 499 N.E.2d at 664.
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was jurisdictional and, therefore, was not waivable.30 Subsequently, in Netzel v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,302 another intermediate Illinois appellate court determined, on the basis of Lueck,
that LMRA preemption was jurisdictional, and, therefore, the
court could raise the matter sua sponte.03 After a reconsideration
mandated by the Illinois Supreme Court, the appellate court found
no preemption. 1 01
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays,3 a05°
also determined that the litigant had not waived preemption. 6
Upon reconsideration mandated by the United States Supreme
Court, the Alabama Supreme Court found no preemption. 07
The foregoing court opinions do not encompass the entire LMRA
litigation concerning waivability. Cases prior to both ERISA's
enactment and the recent confusion concerning the waivability of
ERISA preemption, although not directly addressing the issue,
indicate that a litigant cannot waive LMRA preemption. Local
174, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,308
the case in which the United States Supreme Court first considered
LMRA preemption, involved a union that was sued for strike
damages, and the union raised federal law preemption only in its
motion for a new trial in state court, specifically naming only
NLRA. 30 9 The union did not raise LMRA jurisdictional preemption

under Section 301 until it filed a writ of certiorari after it had lost
in the state supreme court. 10 The Washington Supreme Court had
301. Id.
302. 165 Ill. App. 3d 685, 520 N.E.2d 665 (1988), modified, 181 Ill. App. 3d 808, 537
N.E.2d 1348 (1989) (ordered by the Illinois Supreme Court on the basis of Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (retaliatory discharge doesn't relate to
collective bargaining agreement)).
The Netzel court faced a retaliatory discharge action in which the employer first raised
LMRA preemption on appeal. Netzel, 165 Il. App. 3d at 686, 520 N.E.2d at 666.
303. Id. at 695, 520 N.E.2d at 671-72.
304. Netzel, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 537 N.E.2d at 1349.
305. 516 So. 2d 517 (Ala. 1987), vacated, 486 U.S. 1050 (1988) (for reconsideration
under Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (retaliatory discharge
does not relate to collective bargaining agreement)), on remand, 547 So. 2d 518 (Ala. 1989)
(no preemption).
The Mays court faced a retaliatory discharge and associated defamation action in which
the employer raised LMRA preemption initially on appeal. Mays, 516 So. 2d at 518.
306. Id. at 519.
307. Id. at 522-23.
308. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
309. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) [hereinafter Petitioner's
Brief] (memorandum of authorities and motion for dismissal mentioned only NLRA
preemption under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
310. Petitioner's Brief at 8 (first mention of Section 301 of LMRA was in respondent's
brief to the Washington Supreme Court).
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used LMRA as support for its jurisdiction to affirm the lower
court's judgment, but it had applied state law substantively.'" The
United States Supreme Court held that the Washington court had
jurisdiction under LMRA, but it must apply federal law. After
applying federal law, the Court affirmed the judgment.31 2 The
Supreme Court has subsequently referred to Lucas Flour Co. as
defining the scope of LMRA preemption when the defendant has
raised the application of the uniform federal laws for the first
31 3
time on appeal.
The Ninth Circuit considered an LMRA benefits-due lawsuit
removed to federal court on diversity.31 4 The plan trustees raised
LMRA Section 301 on appeal to demand application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in an attempt to overturn the state
review standard used by the district court. 15 The Ninth Circuit
reversed and 6 remanded with instructions to apply the uniform
1
federal law.
The result is that whenever a party raises the applicability of
LMRA, the court must apply the uniform federal law, reversing
and remanding the case if necessary, or dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction. 7 Because the Supreme Court has indicated
that Congress modeled ERISA preemption after LMRA preemption,31 ' lower courts should determine that ERISA preemption is
likewise not waivable. The Supreme Court suggested that the
reference to LMRA in ERISA's legislative history is meaningless
31 9
if an ERISA action could be supplemented by a state action.
The directive to follow the LMRA litigation indicates that the
bifurcations created by some appellate courts applying different
waivability rules to different types of lawsuit or forum under
ERISA, are in error because LMRA holdings make no such
distinction.
b.

Waivable
The Ninth Circuit, in Johnson v. Armored Transport of California, Inc.,32O enunciated a lone opinion holding that a defendant
311. Lucas Flour Co. v. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 356 P.2d 1, 5 (Wash.
1960), aff'd, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
312. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103-04.
313. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 n.3 (1988).
314. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1976).
315. Id. at 1368-70; see also HECI Exploration Co. v. Holloway, 862 F.2d 513, 520
n. 11(5th Cir. 1988) (claiming the Rehmar court sua sponte raised Section 301 of LMRA).
316. Rehmar, 555 F.2d at 1372.
317. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1985).
318. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
319. Id. at 56.
320. 813 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra note 176.
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has waived LMRA preemption when not raised at trial. The court
based its opinion, however, on a prior ERISA case . 21 As a result,
the opinion on its own does not accurately reflect LMRA practice.
3. Broad Preemption
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the ERISA
preemption provision provides evidence of the broad scope of that
preemption. The record consists of prior versions of the provision,
the conference report, statements made by various committee
members, and the postpassage congressional report on the desirability of the provision.
During passage of ERISA preemption, the state laws preempted
evolved from those narrowly affecting regulated subject matter to
those more broadly affecting employee benefit plans. 22 Courts
consider statutory construction arguments based on changes made
during the passage or rejection of statutes unreliable.3 23 Although
courts may use these changes to help interpret doubtful or ambiguous provisions, 24 the arguments are generally unreliable because
the court usually is unable to determine why the legislature rejected
the prior language.3 25 In this case, however, a prominent member
of the conference committee, Senator Jacob Javits, the other
cosponsor of the original draft legislation containing a subjectmatter preemption provision3 26 and the senior ranking Republican
on the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,3 27 explained that the Committee rejected the language to avoid "endless
litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on
Federal regulation." 3 2 Allowing waiver of ERISA preemption would
permit some state regulation to displace the uniform federal law
of employee benefit plans.
The conference committee's report also indicates that Congress
intended courts to give broad preemptive effect to the preemption

321. Id. at 1043-44.
322. See supra notes 258-65 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716 (1888).
324. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983) (deletion by Congress of
limiting language contained in an earlier version implies the limitation was not intended to
apply); United States v. St. P., M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918).
325. See, e.g., Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1935) (not conclusive of
meaning); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1913)

(a Senate Conference Committee member contended an omission by amendment did not
exclude, contrary to the Conference Committee report).

326. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Manno, supra note 10, at 61.
327. Note, supra note 275, at 795.
328. 120 CoNo. REc. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).

346
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provision.32 9 Examining this language in light of the preceding bills,
the Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,330 stated that
"the Conference Committee . . .indicated that the section's preemptive scope was as broad as its language." 3 3' Under the plainmeaning rule, this language preempts all state laws relating to
employee benefit plans, and makes no distinction between substantive and procedural laws.
Two conference committee members made statements concerning
the breadth of the preemption. Senator Williams stated that courts
were to construe the preemption provision "in its broadest sense
to all actions of State or local governments" to eliminate inconsistent state regulation. 32 This statement, by the leader of the
committee considering the bill on behalf of the whole Senate,
establishes congressional intent that the provision be given the
widest possible preemptive effect to override state law.
The House heard similar statements, and another prominent
legislator interpreted ERISA's preemption provision to have the
broadest possible effect. Representative John Dent, the Chairman
of the Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor and Education

33 4
Committee 333 and House sponsor of the original legislation,

explained that the preemption provision's effect was "the reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field
of employee benefit plans" and that courts were to apply "this
principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regu' '33
lation of employee benefit plans. 1

329. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 30, at 5162.
Under the substitute, the provisions of title I are to supersede all State laws
that relate to any employee benefit plan that is established by an employer
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that
represents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce ....
The preemption provisions of title I are not to exempt any person from any
State law that regulates insurance, banking or securities.
Id.
330. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
331. Id. at 98; see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478, 482 (1990) (ERISA
preemption provision interpreted in the broad sense); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct.
403, 407 (1990) (ERISA "preemption clause is conspicuous for its breadth").
332. 120 CoNo. REc. S29,933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ArnmN. NEws at 5188-89. "It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute
are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulation, thus eliminating the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans." Id.
(emphasis added).
333. Note, supra note 275, at 795.
334. Note, Blind Faith Conquers Bad Faith: Only Congress Can Save Us After Pilot
Lfe Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1343, 1355 (1988).
335. 120 CONO. Rc. H29,197 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974). "Thus, the provisions of
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Additional congressional explanation appeared in a 1977 report
of the House Committee on Education and Labor after it received
the Joint Pension Task Force study.336 This report indicated that
ERISA preemption was "expressly extended to occupy the field to
the exclusion of state authority" and was to be "sufficiently broad
to leave no room for effective state regulation. 33 7 Although a
report is not contemporaneous legislative history, it is virtually
conclusive as to legislative intent and is persuasive authority for
demonstrating congressional intent.338 This report supports the
broadest possible interpretation of ERISA preemption.
Considering this legislative history, courts should conclude, as
did the Barry court, 3 9 that Congress intended them to construe
the ERISA preemption provision as broadly as possible to end
state law in this arena and replace it with federal law. Any narrower
application of preemption would not eliminate the encroachment
of inconsistent state laws;
After the creation of this legislative history, the Supreme Court
has recognized at least one nonwaivable preemption in implicit
NLRA preemption. 3a 40 Explicit ERISA preemption should at least
equal the breadth of implicit NLRA preemption, which does not
recognize waivability. Therefore, a state court could only assert
subject matter jurisdiction over a pension fund case through ERISA,
because the alternative state law no longer exists due to the broad
preemption.

section 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice or decision of any State, subdivision
thereof or any agency or instrumentality thereof ... which would affect any employee
benefit plan as described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b)." Id. (emphasis
added).
336. ERISA Sections 3021 and 3022 created the Joint Pension, Profit-Sharing, and
Employee Stock Ownership Plan Task Force to study within two years of ERISA's effective
date, among other items, the effects and desirability of ERISA preemption. 29 U.S.C. §§
1221-22 (1988).
337. H.R. REp. No. 1785 (Activity Report of the House Comm. on Education & Labor),
94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 46-47 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REp, No. 1785].
Based on our examination of the effects of section 514, it is our judgment
that the legislative scheme of ERISA is sufficiently broad to leave no room for
effective state regulation within the field preempted. Similarly it is our finding
that the Federal interest and the need for national uniformity are so great that
the enforcement of a state regulation should be precluded ....

Accordingly, any

activity by a state or political subdivision thereof, which relates to employee
benefit plans ...

is preempted by section 514(a).

Id. (emphasis added).
338. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942).
339. Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 478 N.E.2d 707 (1985); see
supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
340. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380 (1986).
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ERISA preemption is jurisdictional and nonwaivable. To conclude otherwise could result in inconsistent state law which would
be contrary to the intended result expressed in the explanations
for the legislative change, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the conference committee's report, Senator Williams's and Representative Dent's statements, and the review committee's stated
understanding. Senator Javits suggested that if experience reveals
the ERISA preemption provision to be overly broad on policy

grounds, Congress, not the judiciary, should modify the provision
by creating exceptions in pursuit of a better policy. 34' The limited

success of congressional attempts to narrow ERISA preemption 42
and the Supreme Court's adherence to literalism 3 43 mandate that
courts apply ERISA preemption broadly and literally, thereby

excluding waivability of ERISA preemption. If future policy determinations demand an exception to ERISA preemption, Con-

gress, not the courts, should fashion it.
120 CONG. REC. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1974).
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a [preemption] policy-also
agreed to assign the Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of
studying and evaluating preemption in connection with State authorities and
reporting its findings to the Congress. If it is determined that the preemption
policy devised has the effect of precluding essential legislation at either the State
or Federal level, appropriate modifications can be made.
Id.; see also Irish & Cohen, supra note 277, at 113.
342. See Irish & Cohen, supra note 277, at 114-15.
In 1979, Senators Williams and Javits drafted a bill, S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REc. 933 (1979), to create additional exceptions for ground-breaking state legislations,
125 CONG. REC. 947 (1979) (Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, struck down in Standard
Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.
1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981)); to uphold one court created implied exception,
125 CoNo. REc. 947 (1979) (divorce decrees under Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981)); to
overrule another court created implied exception, 125 CONG. REC. 947 (1979) (laws requiring
mental health benefits in group insurance policies under Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d
70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978)); and to affirm two denials of court
implied exceptions, 125 CONG. REc. 947 (1979) (insurance inquiry into benefit status of
participants under Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 553
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977), and state taxes measured in
terms of benefit paid under National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F.
Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978)).
Congress only partially adopted two of these modifications: (1) to permit partial enforcement of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2605,
2612 (1983); and (2) to permit qualifying domestic relations orders thereby excluding other
domestic relations orders. Pub. L. No. 98-97, § 104, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (1984).
343. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); see also Note, ERISA Preemption
of California Tort and Bad Faith Law: What's Left?, 22 U.S.F. L. RaV. 519, 532 (1988)
(it is clear the Supreme Court will apply ERISA preemption with expansive force).
341.
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4.

Uniformity
Another strand of legislative history relates to the desire of
Congress to establish uniform federal rules for employee benefit
plans. This appears both in the committee reports and in statements
of committee members.
The purpose of a uniform federal law regulating private employee benefit plans was to encourage the growth of such plans.
A House committee report on one of the predecessor bills to
ERISA noted that "the objective is to increase the number of
individuals participating in employer-financed plans ... [and to]
continue[] the approach in present law of encouraging the establishment of retirement plans which contain socially desirable provisions .... ",344 The Senate report urging the passage of ERISA
noted that ERISA "will also serve to restore credibility and faith
in the private pension plans designed for American working men
and women, and this should serve to encourage rather than diminish efforts by management and industry to expand pension
plan coverage and to improve benefits for workers. 3 45 Senator
Williams noted that ERISA was "designed to improve and encourage the expansion of private pension plans." 3 " The ranking
majority member of the House Ways and Means Committee,
Representative Al Ullman, made similar remarks on the introduction of the conference committee report that led to ERISA's
passage. He stated that ERISA's requirements were "carefully
designed to provide adequate protection for employees and, at the
same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and devel3 a47
opment of private pension plans.
The key to this uniformity and encouragement is the ERISA
preemption provision insuring that state law will not upset the
delicate balance between employees and employers. The Supreme
Court has recognized this delicate "balancing of the need for
prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. "348
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare indicated that Congress intended ERISA preemption to

344.
345.
ADM N.
346.

H.R. REp. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEWS 4838, 4849 [hereinafter S. RE,. No. 127].
120 CONG. REc. S29,928 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974).
347. 120 CONG. REC. H29,198 (daily ed. Aug. 20) reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADhnN. NEws 5166-67. "This legislation provides urgently needed reform in the pension
area. But, at the same time, it continues the basic governmental policy of encouraging the
growth and development of voluntary private pension plans." Id.
348. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
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create uniformity in employee benefit law in order to give interstate
plan fiduciaries certainty about the legality of their actions without
reference to varying state laws.3 49 One of these fiduciary standards
is ERISA's arbitrary and capricious review standard for discretionary fiduciary decisions .3
The report of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor
stated that ERISA alone was "a uniform source of law" for
fiduciary standards.35 The reason was "to remove jurisdictional
and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state
law. 35 2 This is evidence that Congress considered state procedural
rules when creating the preemption provision. As a result, ERISA
preemption is jurisdictional and not waivable.
Senator Javits revealed the bipartisan nature of the ERISA
preemption provision in similar statements concerning the efficacy
of the provision. He indicated that "the interests of urfiformity
... required" that the ERISA preemption provision provide for

349.

S. REp. No. 127, supra note 345, at 4865, 4871.
Furthermore, a fiduciary standard embodied in Federal legislation is considered
desirable because it will bring a measure of uniformity in an area where decisions
under the same set of facts may differ from state to state ....
Finally, it is evident that the operations of employee benefit plans are increasingly interstate. The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster
will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of
proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws ....
... [S]tate law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of employee
benefit plans, the Committee believes it essential to provide for a uniform source
of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability standards, for
evaluating fiduciary conduct, and for creating a single reporting and disclosure
system in lieu of burdensome multiple reports.
Id. (emphasis added).
350. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
351. S. REp. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. CODE &
ADMN. NEws 4639, 4655.
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable
remedies available in both state and federal courts and to remove jurisdictional
and procedural obstacles which in the past appear to have hampered effective
enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities under state law for recovery of benefits
due to participants ....
Except where plans are not subject to this Act and in certain other enumerated
circumstances, state law is preempted. Because of the interstate character of
employee benefit plans, the committee believes it essential to provide for a
uniform source of law in the areas of vesting, funding, insurance and portability
standards, for evaluation of fiduciary conduct, and for creating a single reporting
and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple reports ....
Id. (emphasis added).
352. Id.
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"the displacement of State action in the field of private employee
' This pronouncement indicates that the ERISA
benefit programs." 353
preemption provision supersedes state law. Therefore, state law
cannot constitute the basis of state court jurisdiction, confirming
the construction of the ERISA preemption provision under the
plain-meaning rule.
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
resulting from the Joint Pension Task Force study indicated that
Congress intends the ERISA preemption to bring about the uniformity of decision necessary for plan fiduciaries
to determine
354
their actions without reference to state laws.
The Supreme Court has also declared that the legislative history
of the comprehensive remedies provided by ERISA's jurisdictional
provision indicates a congressional intent to displace state law to
prevent state actions from supplementing the federal remedies. 5
When the state law falls within the preemption savings clause but
356
affects the federal remedies, ERISA preempts that state law.
This legislative history indicates a clear intent to make the rules
governing employee benefit plans nationally uniform. In another
context, without examining the legislative history, the Supreme
Court ruled on waiver of preemption under a statute through
which Congress had intended to create uniform rules. When the
Supreme Court first recognized preemption of state law by NLRA
35 7
for unfair labor practices, it did so for reasons of uniformity.

353. 120 CONG. RFc. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974); see also id. at S29,933 (statement
of Sen. Williams that ERISA preemption is to eliminate "the threat of conflicting or
inconsistent state and local regulation of employee benefit plans"); id. at H29,197 (statement
of Rep. Dent that ERISA preemption is to reserve "to Federal authority the sole power
to regulate the field of employee benefit plans").
354. See S. REP. No. 127, supra note 345, at 4865-71.
355. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
356. Id.; see also Roberson v. Equitable Assurance Soc'y, 661 F. Supp. 416, 424 (C.D.
Cal. 1987), aff'd mem., 869 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1989); Note, supra note 334, at 1382.
357. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Garmon
court noted:
"Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety
of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies .... A multiplicity
of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible
or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law ......
...To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central
aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power
asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered
whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather
than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations.
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Although NLRA has no express preemption provision, the Court
recognized preemption because of a perceived conflict between
state and federal regulation of the same subject. 3 8 The Court
recognized that a conflict could frustrate the national purpose of
fostering unionization, NLRA's function, by permitting bodies of
state law to arise.35 9 For this reason, the Court found that NLRA
preemption was jurisdictional and nonwaivable.3 6
Courts should find that ERISA preemption is also jurisdictional
and nonwaivable. Because ERISA preemption is express and not
implicit, the uniformity sought concerns only encroachment by,
and not accommodation with, state law. The function of ERISA
is to foster private pension plans. 361 To advance that purpose,
Congress has created a system of uniform regulation under federal
law by eradicating state law. The only real difference between
NLRA and ERISA is that ERISA contains express provisions and
express legislative history. Therefore, under ERISA, the court does
not need to infer an intent from the procedures outlined in the
statute.
There is one more policy reason for adhering to an exclusive
federal remedy and denying supplemental state actions through
waiver. Most benefits-due claims are small in comparison to state
punitive damages. This results in a reluctance by employee-beneficiary attorneys to negotiate settlements when state punitive damages are involved.3 62 Elimination of the possibility of state punitive
damages removes the greatest obstacle to settlement, reduces the
stakes, and fosters settlement negotiations. 63 This comports with
Senator Javits's statement that Congress intended ERISA preemption to eliminate endless litigation over the validity of state action

Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct which is
the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national
purposes.
Id. at 242-44 (quoting Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 455, 490-91 (1953)).
358.

See, e.g., R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING 767 (1976) (conflict between substantive provisions of laws and potential conflict
between enforcement bodies).
359. Id. at 4-5 (describing Section 7 of NLRA as protecting the right to unionize, and
Section 8 of NLRA as prohibiting prohibit employer deterrence practices).
360. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 398-99 (1986).
361. See supra notes 345-48; see also Manno, supra note 10, at 51 (suggesting that plan
administrators, faced with inconsistent federal and state judicial pronouncements, will
terminate employee benefit plans).
362. See Chittenden, ERISA Preemption: The Demise of Bad Faith Actions in Group
Insurance Cases, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 517, 531 (1988).
363. See id.

1991]

ERISA

PREEMPTION

that might impinge on federal regulation.
only fosters that prohibited litigation.
V.

64

Admitting waivability

CONCLUSION

Based on both the ERISA preemption provision's literal words
and its legislative history, any court following the Supreme Court's
directive in determining the procedural effect of ERISA preemption
must conclude that a litigant can raise ERISA preemption for the
first time after trial or on appeal.3 65 Congressional intent, expressed

364. See supra note 328.
365. Recently, the United States Supreme Court considered a case in which ERISA
preemption was first raised on appeal, but the case did not involve waiver. In IngersollRand Co. v. McClendon, II1 S. Ct. 478 (1990), rev'g, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), an
employee sued his employer for wrongful discharge under Texas law. Id. at 481. The
termination occurred four months before contributions to a pension plan would have been
required. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 73 (dissenting opinion). Texas follows the employmentat-will doctrine, and the employer obtained summary judgment. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. at
481. The judgment, affirmed by a Texas appellate court, was reversed by the Texas Supreme
Court on public policy grounds. Id. The Texas Supreme Court created a new exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is terminated to avoid a pension plan
contribution under ERISA and remanded to determine the employer's intent for the
termination. McClendon, 779 S.W.2d at 71, 73.
Because this was the first mention of ERISA in the case, the employer explicitly raised
the issue of ERISA preemption for the first time in its motion for rehearing. Respondent's
Motion for Rehearing at 3, 16, McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.
1989) (No. C-7973). The United States Supreme Court considered the ERISA preemption
issue without addressing possible waiver. McClendon, I I I S. Ct. at 482.
McClendon did not involve waiver of ERISA preemption. Waiver can only occur if a
matter is not timely raised initially. See generally Hatchell & Calvert, Some Problems of
Supreme Court Review, 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 303, 306 (1974) (an error is preserved in trial
court through objection in trial court, if the error occurs there). Usually, the matter would
be raised at trial, but frequently the matter is raised or the error occurs at an appellate
level. In the latter situation, it is proper to raise the objection for the first time at the
appellate level. See Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 53 n.38 (1965) (point of
collateral estoppel was preserved by raising it initially in the motion for rehearing in the
circuit court, when estoppel was based on a circuit court opinion arising between the
argument and the opinion); Moore v. Dilworth, 142 Tex. 538, 543-44, 179 S.W.2d 940,
942 (1944) (error of appellate court not preserved by omitting it from motion for rehearing
when error was failure to remand rather than render decision). Because ERISA's application
to McClendon first arose in the Texas Supreme Court, the first opportunity to raise the
matter of ERISA preemption was in the motion for rehearing. Therefore, the matter could
not have been waived.
In McClendon, the Texas Supreme Court interjected ERISA due to a quirk in Texas
summary judgment law. Texas summary judgment law provides that defendant movants
have the burden to show conclusively that plaintiff nonmovants cannot prove their case by
showing one missing element. See Combs v. Fantastic Homes, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 340, 343
(Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (the losing nonmovant may raise on appeal the insufficiency of the
movant's evidence to show that there is no fact issue), approved, 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.
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in both ERISA's language and legislative history, mandates this
result. ERISA actions are to follow the LMRA practice of nonwaivability of preemption. ERISA preemption should be as broad
as possible and should be at least as extensive as NLRA preemption, which does not recognize waivability of preemption. The
function of ERISA is to encourage the development of the private
employee benefit system through the development of a uniform
federal law governing employee benefit plans. To permit waiver
of ERISA preemption, as some courts have done, thwarts this
congressional intent.

1979). Therefore, in McClendon, the mere mention, in response to the motion in the trial
court, that the termination occurred four months before the employer would have been
required to make a contribution to the pension plan raised the fact question of whether
the termination was to avoid the contribution.
Unlike Texas summary judgment law, federal summary judgment law places the burden
of proof on the other party. Once the defendant files and supports its motion with some
evidence, then the plaintiff has the burden to prove its case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) ("Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment ... against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial");
Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770, 779 (1988). Because most states follow the federal
procedural rule, see C. WRIGHT, supra note 83, § 62, at 406, the Texas result is not likely
to be available in other procedural systems.

